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                                                                                  ABSTRACT  
 
The establishment and growth of the Greek stock market were coincident with development episodes, financial 
upheavals and geographic expansions of the country’s economy over the period 1880-1940. We explore the growth 
of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) through new listings and Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. We examine changes in exchange governance and listing requirements. On a theme not 
addressed before, we find that simple listings were far more numerous than actual IPOs. IPOs in Greece remained 
unregulated throughout the period. Their under-pricing became pronounced in the later parts of the period, 
especially the 1920s. The study presents data on ‘quasi-IPOs’ (i.e. capital increases shortly after listing) and shows 
that they offer a more accurate assessment of the demand for the financing of listing firms in an emerging market. 
Robust evidence is presented that as the Exchange developed it also underwent a change in character, becoming 
more oriented to the domestic market and catering to smaller firms in domestic manufacturing in the post-World 
War I era that marked the end of early globalization. 
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I. Introduction 
 The object of this paper is the study of listings and public offerings of securities in the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) from its inception in 1880 to the entry of Greece into the second war in 1940. No previous 
comparable research exists for the growth of the Greek Stock Exchange. This is a first study of capital raising in an 
emerging European Exchange to be juxtaposed to several such studies of developed exchanges in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries 2. 
 Stock exchanges are trade venues but their longer-term significance lies in their role in the funding of 
public and private ventures and the growth of firms and sectors. The impetus for the development of exchanges in 
Europe since the 18th century has been furnished by the need to amass capital resources. Exchanges combine the 
collection of capital with the advantage of secondary trading. These two fundamental aspects of growth are not 
inseparable. Listing on an Exchange can occur with or without a concurrent public offering. Whereas a public 
offering is a direct capital-gathering exercise, listing can make an indirect contribution by increasing the visibility 
and the reputation of a potential issuer. In developed liquid markets, public offers are a very visible activity. In 
emerging less liquid markets however, simple listings may predominate in market development. The present study 
focuses on listings and public offerings as separable aspects of capital gathering. Our findings underpin this 
separation: public offerings in the ASE were relatively limited, even during periods when listings were in high 
demand. We offer analysis for this feature. 
 The creation of the ASE was the second major financial innovation in 19th century Greece, after the 
establishment of the National Bank in the 1840s. To acknowledge the international context, we note that the late 
19th century was a period of ‘emergence’ of many peripheral stock markets in Europe and the rest of the world. 
These markets grew alongside well-established ones in the European centers3. Their ‘emergence’ was correlated 
with the rise of international capital flows to new sovereign states, especially in the form of government loans4. The 
ASE was no exception. Officially chartered over the period 1876-78, it started operations in 1880. In 1878 the 
Greek state had regained access to foreign finance after an embargo of 45 years. The ASE, in which both 
government bonds and private stocks would trade, was a necessary mechanism for capital gathering and transfer, 
and would prove to be one of the longest-lived institutions in modern Greece.  
                                                          
2 See studies for London, Berlin and New York by Derrien and Kesckes, ‘The Initial Public Offerings of listed firms'; Chambers, 
'Gentlemanly capitalism revisited: A case study of underpricing of initial public offerings on the London stock exchange, 1946–1986'; 
Lehman, ‘Underwriter activity and performance of Initial  Public Offerings in Imperial Germany between 1897-1914: The role of reputation’ 
Chambers, 'Going public in interwar Britain'; Fohlin, 'Asymmetric information, market power, and the underpricing of new stock issues in 
Germany, 1882-1892'; Fohlin and Reinold  'Common stock returns in the pre-WWI Berlin stock exchange'; Chambers, ‘Going public in 
interwar Britain’; Burhop; 'The underpricing of initial public offerings at the berlin stock exchange, 1870-96; Burhop et al., Regulating IPOs: 
Evidence from going public in London, 1900-1913'; Lehmann, 'Taking firms to the stock market: IPOs and the importance of large banks in 
imperial Germany, 1896-1913'. 
3 Batillosi and Morys, ‘Emerging stock markets in historical perspective: A Research Agenda'.  
4 Bouvier, ‘Iinitiation au vocabulaire et aux mécanismes économiques contemporains’; and O’Rourke and Williamson, 'Globalization and 
history, the evolution of nineteenth century atlantic economy', dicuss about the rise of international capital flows.  
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Greek political and economic history has been turbulent over the period 1880-1940. The country’s area and 
population practically doubled. Changes were not gradual but abrupt, mostly outcomes of wars that were won and 
wars that were lost; and there was a succession of periods that ranged from sovereign bankruptcy in 1893 to 
impressive leaps in development in the early 1900s and the 1920s. Over the sixty years covered in this study, 
Greece was embroiled in six wars and two sovereign bankruptcies. The Exchange evolved along a path defined by 
economic conditions of each period5. Arguably, it provided a mechanism for mobilization of resources and 
modernization through the recapitalization of older firms and the emergence of new ventures and sectors.  
Recent historical research on financial development has been influenced by prevalent institutional theories: one 
is the view of the positive impact of ‘common law’ systems6; the other is the view of the positive impact of 
‘openness’ and capital flow liberalization which contain the power of domestic financial incumbents and liberate a 
financial dynamic7. The Greek legal system has been of the continental variety so that it cannot explain the 
variation between periods of market development and periods of stagnation. On the front of economic openness 
and the perspective argued by Rajan and Zingales, Greece followed the general path of many other European 
countries. It remained open to capital flows and participated in the rise of globalization up to the First World War. 
From that point on, Greece became a relatively closed economy but interestingly one with expanding frontiers. The 
actual occurrence and direction of capital flows varied throughout the period, especially as a result of sovereign 
bankruptcies, wars and the collapse of international monetary systems. In sum, we argue that the variation between 
stock market development and stagnation and the character of development cannot be prima facie attributed to 
large shifts in the legal system, but can be understood on the basis of economic ‘openness’ and economic size. In 
addition, and since historical detail matters, we focus on economic conjuncture and the factors affecting variation 
of the size and character of the domestic market that expanded significantly over the period of study. We provide a 
test of the relation of listing activity with economic growth, and find positive results.  
 Financial theories of capital gathering establish useful propositions that can inform historical study. It is 
generally acknowledged that markets for external finance can only function if there is an adequate level of trust 
between investors, issuers and sponsors. In a variety of financial models, a specific aspect of trust is represented as 
informational asymmetry. Prior argument and evidence indicate that such asymmetry can make the cost of external 
finance so high as to be prohibitive8. In a theoretical context more directly applicable to initial public offerings, it is 
                                                          
5 Valaoritis, ‘The history of the National Bank of Greece, 1842-1902’; Papagiannakis, ‘The Greek rail-roads, (1882-1910)’; Kostis 'Les 
enfants gâtés de l'histoire: The formation of neo-hellenic state’; Psalidopoulos, 'The crises of 1929 and the Greek Economists'; 
Vaxevanoglou, ‘The Greek Capitalists, 1900-1940'; Dertilis, 'History of the modern Greek state 1830-1920'; Kokinakis, 'Currency and 
politics in Greece 1830-1910'; Kremmidas, ‘Introduction to Modern Greek Economic History’ have discussed historic economic conditions  
in various periods. 
6 The legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors in 49 countries have been examined by LaPorta, Lopez-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Law and Finance', pp. 1113-1155.   
7 Rajan and Zingales, 'The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the twentieth century', pp. 5-50 offer comparative aspects 
of stock market capitalization to  GDP ratios and number of listed companies per million people.  
8 Myers and Majluf, 'Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have', show that firms 
may refuse to issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable investment opportunities. 
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argued that asymmetric information among investors leads to underpricing of new issues, an effect likened to a 
‘winners curse’9. A considerable strand of subsequent literature has upheld the notion that institutional, regulatory 
and governance arrangements can mitigate asymmetries and improve trust10. Extensive empirical work in 
contemporary markets has verified however considerable underpricing of new equity issues, but with much 
variation across time and space11.  
 Taking the cue from contemporary markets, historical researchers have focused on capital-gathering in the 
major European markets (where transactions and data are ample) and have examined the underpricing phenomenon 
in IPOs of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Chambers and Dimson12 examining the track record of the London 
Exchange13, make a remarkable observation: a long-term rise in underpricing appears to have occurred over time, 
in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure and the prestige of IPO underwriters.  
Working on the Berlin Exchange, investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced, on the 
contrary, low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the 
market14. Evidence reveals that during the early 20th century IPOs were regulated more heavily in Germany than in 
Britain and as a result the failure rate of IPOs on the Berlin Stock Exchange was lower than it was in London.15 
Even though German IPO business was in the hands of an oligopoly, the terms of IPOs through tight regulation of 
underwriting, ensured the quality of firms on the German market16. We draw a lesson from regulatory experiences 
in early developed markets, as compared to a peripheral one with minimal regulation. 
 A peripheral emerging market, as the ASE in the 19th century, cannot be approached however on the same 
footing and with the same analytical agenda as developed central markets in Europe where frequent transactions 
and ample data are available. Its institutional reputation had to be established and its liquidity had to be secured in 
an environment where liquidity was generally scarce and monetary values exhibited great fluctuation. It follows 
that when we examine listing requirements and the growth of the Exchange in terms of listings and primary 
                                                          
9 The ‘winners curse’ argument by Rock, 'Why new issues are underpriced', pp. 187-212 depends upon the existence of a group of investors 
whose information is superior to that of all other investors. 
10 Beatty and Ritter 'Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings', pp. 213-232, Loughran and Ritter, ‘Why  
has IPO underpricing changed over time?' pp. 5-37 and Ljunqgvist, 'IPO underpricing, in B. Eckbo', ed.: ‘Handbook of corporate finance: 
Empirical corporate finance’. 
11 There are several studies of public offerings in the ASE but all focus on recent periods beginning with the 1980s11 [e.g. Kazantzis and 
Levis, 'Price support and initial public offerings: Evidence from Athens Stock Exchange', pp. 185-200; Thomadakis et al., ‘Long term 
performance of Greek IPOs', pp. 117-141; Thomadakis et al, ‘Collateral regulation and IPO specific liberalization: The case or price limits in 
the Athens Stock Exchange’. There are also few, mostly official, histories of the Exchange which do not illuminate sufficiently its 
fundamental function of capital gathering and company finance (see Platanopoulos, ‘History of the Athens Stock Exchange’, 1876-1976). 
12 Chambers and Dimson, 'IPO underpricing over the very long run', pp.1407-1443 present evidence covering British IPOs since World War 
I. During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 9.15% in the period 
from 1946 to 1986. 
13 In a modern study involving 786 IPOs in LSE, Derrien and Kesckes, 'The Initial Public Offerings of listed firms' present the case of a 
number of firms that list without issuing equity and then issuing equity shortly after, that this two-stage offering strategy is less costly than 
an initial public offering (IPO) because trading reduces the valuation uncertainty of these firms before they issue equity. 
14 Fohlin, 'Asymmetric information, market power and the underpricing of new stock issues in Germany, 1882-1892', pp.630-56. 
Underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power. 
15 IPOs listed on the London Stock Exchange performed as well as Berlin IPOs despite the Berlin market being more regulated, Burhop et 
al., 'Is regulation essential to stock market development? Going public in London and Berlin, 1900-1913'.  
16 Lehmann, ‘Taking firms to the stock market: IPOs and the importance of large banks in imperial Germany, 1896-1913’. 
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offerings, we must be cognizant of a more general correlation of the path of the Exchange to economic and political 
conditions. Thus, we pay a lot of attention to historical circumstance in the Greek economy over the period.  
 Differing from studies focusing on developed markets, we have expanded the meaning of IPOs to capital 
increases occurring in the two years following listing. We have collected data on these capital increases and 
compare them to actual primary offerings. The view of listings as a first step towards the raising of external capital 
finds support from these comparisons. We also undertake limited analysis of IPO underpricing itself, within the 
confines of our small number of observations. The results are not surprising in the face of contemporary 
international evidence. 
 IPOs remained unregulated throughout the period and there is little evidence about the involvement of 
professional investment banking in primary security issues and their pricing. This is a major difference from 
developed markets of that period, where IPOs were regulated and investment banking was formalised. It does not 
appear that standardised arrangements of investment banking emerged in Greece, although some services of 
investment bankers were provided. Hence, disclosure quality remained uneven and low. The population of IPOs 
was also low. It is noteworthy nonetheless that even in this small population under-pricing made an appearance 
considerably after the end of the First World War. We present historical conjectures for the timid growth of IPOs 
and look at possible factors to explain IPO pricing in line with the empirical literature.  
 The early enlargement of the Greek stock market was clearly driven by demand for listings. This implies 
that, contrary to what we know of developed markets, the study of listings is a pillar for understanding the 
evolution of peripheral markets. In the Greek case, we document a decisive shift in the character, the size and 
sector of listings and IPOs between the first decades of ASE operation and the boom decade of the 1920s. This shift 
was related to a reorientation of economic activity, with emphasis on light domestic manufacturing. It also 
correlated to stock market entries by smaller firms, a phenomenon that may be described as a ‘democratisation of 
market finance’. Interestingly, this democratization was evident in the population of listings but also implied visible 
changes in pricing of primary offerings.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the creation of the ASE, the evolution of 
its governance and listing requirements. Section III presents the periodization of our study, the historical features of 
each sub-period, and the related characteristics of our dataset. In Section IV we present the main statistical features 
of our dataset, including the discussion of quasi IPOs. We also present hypothesis about the macro-determinants of 
new listings. In Section V we undertake an analysis of IPO pricing and describe a model of underpricing. In 
Section VI we present empirical results of simple regression models. Section VII concludes the paper. 
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II. Exchange Foundation, Governance and Development 
A. Unregulated Public Offers, the “Free Market” and the Genesis of an Organized Market 
The birth of the ASE was doubtlessly conditioned by a dramatic precedent: a ferocious cycle of mania and 
panic that grew out of unregulated public offers of shares traded in an informal market in the early 1870s. The 
mania coincided with the first attempts at Greek industrialization17, focused on mining and metalworking shares 
primarily, but encompassed banking shares as well. This was a time of speculative frenzy in other European 
exchanges. The link of the Athenian transactions with those of Europe was forged through the activities of Greek 
‘diaspora’ financiers, who, during the 1870s, were increasingly active in Athens along with the Ottoman Empire 
and other European capitals18.  
 Citizens of the independent Kingdom of Greece thus had their first serious brush with a speculative bubble 
in 1873. The public offer that sparked the mania was of shares in a company running the metal processing plant 
around the mine of Lavrion, a rich silver source in ancient times. Rumors and reckless political rhetoric about 
endless riches led to spectacular high prices, succeeded by rapid decline in early 187419. The ‘Lavreotika’, as the 
events were called, would remain etched in collective memory. The inauguration of public offers of equity shares 
in Greece became an occasion of loss and social suspicion against financial tycoons. The social mistrust would 
influence both the decision to create an organized exchange and proceedings at that exchange for at least the early 
years of its operation.  
 The drama of boom and bust of 1873-74 played out in an informal market that was operating in and around 
a popular Athenian coffee house. Share sales were conducted literally ‘over the counter’ in coffee shops, grocery 
stores and merchant establishments. The organization of new issues, the pricing of the offers, and the details of 
distribution were managed primarily by the issuers and two newly founded merchant banks, the Credit Bank 
established in 1872 and the Industrial Credit Bank established in early 1873. The two banks had been launched by 
competing groups of recently arrived Greek ‘diaspora’ financiers and had also offered shares to the public. 20 
Merchant banking was surely a significant innovation in the economy of Greece at the time. The prime mover of 
innovation was Andreas Syngros, a famous financier-tycoon who had made a fortune in the Ottoman Empire, 
trading commodities and Ottoman public bonds. 
 In the aftermath of the bust and the political outcry that ensued, the creation of an organized market was 
announced in 1876 with the publication of a royal decree that contained the first charter and a body of rudimentary 
rules of the Exchange. The rulebook would be revised in 1879 and actual operation would be inaugurated in 188021. 
                                                          
17 Agriantoni, ‘The beginning of industrialization in 19th century Greece'.  
18 Syngros, 'The diaries'. 
19 The stock price of the Lavrion Metalworks went from 46 francs on April 17 1873 to 156 francs on May 1st, declining to 74 francs a few 
months later. See Dertilis ‘The issue of banks’, Appendix VII.  
20 Dertilis, 'History of the modern Greek state 1830-1920', pp. 411-412 and Platanopoulos, 'One Hundred Year of the Athens Stock 
Exchange', pp. 50-51. 
21 Athens Stock Exchange Organizational Charters 1876, 1879. 
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Operation has continued to this day, with several interruptions during wars and crises of course, making the ASE 
the second longest-lived financial institution in the country22.  
 A landmark development that would change the course of the Greek market for capital had preceded the 
launch of the Exchange: the Greek State, embargoed for decades from international markets due to sovereign 
defaults in the 1830s, regained access to international borrowing23. This was a time in which the international 
markets for bonds were expanding, strong capital exports from the developed European economies were directed to 
the world periphery and the role of exchanges was prominent in the process. In that context, the prospect of capital 
inflows to Greece hastened the inauguration of the organized Exchange as an official trading venue for government 
paper, company equities or bonds24.  
 A remarkable aspect of the Exchange as a public market for securities is that its charter included no 
regulation of public offers of shares, nor was a public offer required for listing. The absence of such provision 
appears all the more conspicuous considering the traumatic events of 1873-74, when the unregulated public offer of 
shares had been at the center of a big ‘boom and bust’ crisis. The continuation of the unregulated status of public 
offers testified to the power of issuers and financiers, especially at a time when Greece was reconnecting to the 
international financial market in which entrepreneurs belonging to the Greek Diaspora were already active.  
In our view, a policy that could encourage IPO growth would have been quality regulation of IPOs and 
especially mandatory disclosure rules. Such regulation existed already in more developed markets. In Greece 
however it was not forthcoming. This is puzzling, considering that regulation of both listing requirements and 
transaction rules was undertaken during the period. The Exchange was not a government operation. It was a self-
regulated entity governed by its members25. It had basic rules of transaction and settlement as well as minimum 
listing requirements.  On its first bulletin issued on May 12, 188026, the 17 securities listed for trading included six 
government bonds, one corporate bond and ten company equities. As we document below, listings were far more 
numerous than initial public offerings. Most companies would acquire their first capital before listing by placement 
of shares among narrow groups or even a public offer. They would also engage in capital increases after listing. In 
following sections of the paper we will come back for a closer look at governance reforms and the analysis of 
listings and public offerings of private shares.  
 The inauguration of the Exchange did not subjugate legally (or in practice) the pre-existing ‘free market’ 
for shares, as the over-the-counter market was called in 19th century Athens. The two coexisted and operated in 
parallel. Shares listed on the Exchange would trade in both markets, but of course many non-listed shares were also 
traded over the counter. In fact, it appears that the ‘free market’ was a lively one. In the early years, trading on the 
                                                          
22 The longest-lived financial institution is the National Bank of Greece which was founded in 1842. 
23 Dertilis, 'History of the modern Greek state 1830-1920'.  
24 Bouvier, ‘Initiation au vocabulaire et aux mécanismes économiques contemporains’, pp. 251-254. 
25 The Organizational Charter published in 1879 appointed a five-member committee as the governing board. All five members were 
licensed brokers. See Platanopoulos, 'History of the Athens Stock Exchange, 1876-1976', ibid, p. 37. 
26 Athens Stock Exchange, ‘Review 1936’ p.7 (1937). 
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Exchange would last for up to three quarters of an hour, but the ‘free market’ would continue. A contemporary 
newspaper reports that the more important transactions were conducted in the ‘free market’27. In 1884 there was 
trading of 26 company shares (including a few foreign ones) in the ‘free market’, more than twice the number of 
shares listed on the Exchange. Some of the shares traded off-market would go on to become listed, having 
presumably proved their tradability28. It is notable that no foreign company issues were traded on the Exchange.  
 An early historian of the Athens exchange wrote: “this ‘free market’ operated in the streets around the 
Stock Exchange. It functioned from morning till night, often to midnight. It was not organized. Some dealers had 
offices others not. The trading customs followed those of the official exchange. Guarantees and sureties required 
were, as a rule, lower than the normal ones”29. The ‘free market’ was to be officially sidelined by the grant of 
monopoly status to the Exchange in 1918; however evidence of free market operations persists in press reports 
throughout the 1920s. 
 
B. The Contours of Stock Exchange Development 
In this section we present broad quantitative characteristics of the ASE, over the period examined, and its 
comparative appearance vis-à-vis other contemporary markets. Our evidence is limited, as we have no systematic 
data on trading volumes and transactions, until the very last part of the period. Nevertheless, we have hand 
calculated end-of-year estimates of capitalizations for selected years, which enable a comparative view. As 
mentioned in the previous section, during the first forty years of the period a ‘free market’ was functioning outside 
the official exchange, but so far we have discovered little reliable quantitative evidence of its activity. Thus, what 
we report here refers only to the official Exchange. We explain data sources and limitations in Appendix A.  
The creation of stock exchanges in the 19th century was often motivated by trading needs for government 
debt. The Greek case was no exception, since its organization coincided with the re-entry of Greece into the 
international bond market. It is therefore important to gauge the relative weight of private stocks as compared to 
public and private debt securities. In Table 1 we present capitalizations for each category of security at the end of 
each decade from 1880 to 1930, all estimated in gold sovereigns.  
 
Please Insert Table 1 about here 
The relative weight of shares as compared to government bonds is not negligible, varying from a low of about 18 
percent in 1900 to a high of 108 percent in 1920. It is important to note that large changes in the capitalization of 
public debt are observed in periods when public borrowing had intensified as was the case in the 1890s and the 
1920s (We comment on financial events in these periods in section III below). Although we have no evidence on 
                                                          
27 Newspaper ‘Ermis’ [Hermes] April 4, 1882. 
28 Newspaper ‘Ermis’ [Hermes] April 15, 1884. 
29 Keramidas, ‘Stock Exchanges’. 
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trading volumes in the earlier periods, we can gain a glimpse of relative magnitudes in the period 1929-40, for 
which volume data is available, as shown in figure 1.  
 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
The diagram shows clearly that trading volume for shares does surpass bond trading in some periods, 
notably in 1929, again as an indication that shares were by no means a negligible portion of Exchange activity. The 
fact that the Exchange became quickly a trading venue for private shares is significant as an indication that private 
sector activity was growing.  
A second major question for which we gathered evidence is the comparative standing of the Athens 
Exchange relative to other contemporary exchanges. The starting point for a comparative view is to use widely 
accepted indices such as the ratio of capitalization to GDP and the number of listed firms per million of population. 
In order to obtain as broad a comparison view as possible, we reproduce below parts of two tables from Rajan and 
Zingales to which we add (as a last row) our estimates for Greece in the same years30. On the right panel we show 
metrics for capitalizations over GDP and on the left panel we show the number of listed firms per million of 
population. Our estimates of capitalization in Greece include only equity shares. 
 
Please Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The capitalization-to-GDP ratios – despite the reservations that have been voiced about their comparability 
– show that Greece is relatively high in 1913, comparable to the US and Germany, but goes to a low level in 1938. 
Thus, at the peak of pre-war globalization, the Greek Exchange appears to be within the European trend, to decline 
later considerably due both to the general reversion of globalization and to its own particular circumstances, as we 
shall presently explain.   
Looking at the metric of listed firms per million of population, we note that Greece remains at the low end 
of the comparative scale but shows a very visible growth between 1913 and 1929. In the latter year its metric is in 
fact comparable to that of Germany and Sweden. In the last year, 1938, the Greek ratio is somewhat lower than in 
1929 but remains again comparable to that of Germany and Sweden. On the whole, it appears that the ASE was 
following a pattern similar to other European exchanges and that, at least in terms of listed firms, it developed a 
visible dynamic during the first decades of the 20th century. This dynamic will be a central aspect of our inquiry in 
later sections of this paper.  
A more detailed comparison with the more developed exchanges of the UK and Germany can also be 
made, on the basis of published data, for the metrics of listed firms per million of population and IPOs per million 
                                                          
30 These are extracted from Tables 3 and 5, Rajan and Zingales, 'The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the twentieth 
century' pp. 15-17 and complemented by more recent data in Musacchio & Turner, ‘Does the law and finance hypothesis pass the test of 
history?’; Greek data are calculated from hand collected evidence on stock capitalizations and available sources for GDP and population, 
as per Appendix A.  
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of population. In figure 2 we show the comparative estimates for the period 1900-1925 (Appendix B shows the 
detailed data). 
 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
The left part of the diagram confirms that the ASE was comparable to Berlin in terms of the density of 
listed firms, but both were much lower than London. On the right part of the diagram where IPO densities are 
compared however, the ASE is located below the others throughout the period. Thus, the scarcity of IPO activity on 
the Greek Exchange, relative to what is observed in the more developed exchanges is a basic observation to occupy 
this analysis in later sections. Possible factors that we take up in later discussion are related to liquidity conditions 
but also to questions of transparency and regulation of the quality of IPO activity.  
 
C. Exchange Governance and its Successive Reforms 
From a governance standpoint, the Exchange remained a self-regulated organization until 1918, when a 
landmark law imposed government interventions31. Law 1308 of 1918 was inspired from analogous legislation of 
the 1890s and 1900s in civil law jurisdictions, mainly Germany, France and Italy; its timing was clearly related to 
the occurrence of a very large Stock Exchange bubble in 1918 and the rapid increase in speculation that had 
followed the end of the war. The new law brought about an overhaul both of legal status and operating procedures. 
The Exchange became a public legal entity and was granted a monopoly on legal transactions of shares and bonds, 
following earlier French and German arrangements. Other provisions covered brokers’ duties, clearing and 
settlement, types of transactions, including cash, forward, option and repos. The law additionally introduced, for 
the first time, penal sanctions for misinformation, frauds and abuse of investors’ trust32.  
 Law 1308 established direct government intervention in Exchange affairs; the government acquired major 
powers not only for oversight but also in decision-making. An inspector’s office was installed for supervision of 
the rules of trading, the power to suspend Exchange operation for up to five days. An ‘Exchange Council’, separate 
from the Exchange’s governing board, was constituted; its composition included public servants, bank 
representatives and brokers, the latter being a minority. The Council wielded powers over policy, broker licensing, 
listings and delistings (to which we return below). The Secretary General of the Ministry of Economy chaired it33. 
The Council represented severe curtailment in the power of brokers, removing from their control two decisions of 
strategic importance: broker licensing and securities’ listing. 
 Ten years later, a new law - Law 3632 of 1928 - was passed revising governance structures, rules and 
operations34. As was true at the time of the Exchange’s original founding in 1878, this was also a period of major 
                                                          
31 Papadimos, ‘Collection of Stock Exchange Law’, Law 1308 of 1918. 
32 Law 1308 of 1918, articles 33-34 Papadimos, 'Collection of stock exchange law', pp. 36-37. 
33 Law 1308/1918, articles 3-5. 
34 Gounaropoulos, ‘Stock Exchange Law’, Law 3632/1928. 
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change in financial architecture in Greece and in the country’s adherence to international monetary arrangements. 
In May 1928, Greece established a new central bank, the Bank of Greece, which took over responsibility for 
monetary management; Greece committed to the gold exchange standard at the same time. The prospect of 
regaining full participation in the international monetary system and a new opening to the international economy 
provided the impetus for modernization of the Exchange35.  
 The 1928 law maintained the government inspector clarifying his responsibilities vis-à-vis the governing 
board of the Exchange that was made up of broker-members. Importantly, the Exchange Council that had been 
established in 1918 now assumed powers of final decision in matters that had earlier required Ministerial or 
Cabinet approval. In that sense, the new legislation ‘depoliticized’ the decision process and allowed speedier 
decision-making. In the same spirit, a special ‘Exchange Court’ was established which would rapidly adjudicate 
differences, claims and frauds arising from transactions both among brokers and between brokers and clients36. The 
explicit justification for instituting this court was the need for speedy resolution of disputes, which was impossible 
to achieve in the regular courts37. The penal sanctions for market abuse came under the jurisdiction of the special 
court, and this improved speed of enforcement. The law rebalanced the governance, re-expanding Exchange 
autonomy in areas that had been relegated to government decision in 1918, such as licensing, listing and brokers’ 
disputes.  
 A brokers’ Guarantee Fund, whose primary form had been already established in August 1923, was now 
fully organized as a collectively financed self-insurance fund for brokers. Its express purpose was to cover 
obligations to other brokers in case of a broker’s default and to compensate investors. The Guarantee Fund has 
proved a stable arrangement that survives to this day.  
 The reform of 1928 sought to improve both the efficiency and the credibility of Exchange operation. The 
provisions on speedier enforcement of market abuse prohibitions and of the compensation scheme for investor 
losses due to broker failures formed the first cohesive framework for investor protection in Greece.  
 
D. Listing Requirements 
At the beginning of its operation the Exchange instituted and followed two basic listing conditions for 
shares of private companies. The first was very specific: at least one third of the company capital had to be paid up. 
This ensured credibility for original owners but was also an anti-speculative device against the sale of empty shells 
on the Exchange floor. It was not required to conduct a public offer of shares to obtain listing. There was however a 
second condition for listing: a general provision that shares must show potential for trading activity38. The 
determination of this potential was left to the governing board of the Exchange, based on evidence furnished by the 
                                                          
35 The next landmark reform of the Exchange would come in the 1990s, at the time of preparation for Greece’s entry into the euro-zone. 
36 The Exchange Court was a mixed forum of one senior broker, public servants and two judges; its jurisdiction included brokers’ and 
investor claims, see parliamentary Introduction of Law 3632/1928, Gounaropoulos, ‘Stock Exchange Law’, p.9. 
37 Gounaropoulos, ibid. and Parliamentary Introduction of Law 3632/1928. 
38 Stock Exchange Organizational Charter (1879), article 12, Platanopoulos, 'One Hundred Year of the Athens Stock Exchange', p.37. 
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candidate company. Besides papers certifying its legal status and some form of financial statements, tradability 
could logically be established on only two grounds: (a) evidence of the actual dispersion of ownership before 
listing; (b) actual trading in the lively informal market which was in operation at least until the 1920s. It is highly 
probable that evidence of off-market trading was acceptable in the early years, since the ‘free market’ was 
legitimate until 1918, when the Exchange acquired the legal monopoly of transactions in shares.  
 A far-reaching innovation included in Law 1308 of 1918 was the change in listing requirements and 
procedures.  As compared to the previous constraint of a minimum percent of paid up capital39, the size of capital 
now became a prerequisite for listing. In addition, companies were required to have published at least two annual 
financial statements prior to the time of listing if their capital exceeded 2 million drachmas (80,580 gold 
sovereigns), and one set of annual financial accounts if their capital exceeded 5 million40 (201,450 gold 
sovereigns). Thus, larger capital size was accepted as a criterion of quality. With regard to financial statements, the 
law made no mention of either accounting standards or audits. Nevertheless, the fact that financial reporting was 
elevated to a legal prerequisite for listing boosted the accounting process and the accounting profession.  
 The size criterion acted as a double-edged instrument: it encouraged large firms, even if they were newly 
formed ventures, to seek listing. The earlier requirement of evidence of tradability did not appear in Law 1308. It 
would be inconsistent for a law that instituted a legal monopoly of Exchange transactions to require evidence that 
implicitly admitted the function of the informal market.  
 The same Law of 1918 took the power of listing (and delisting) decisions away from the governing board 
of the Exchange, i.e. the brokers. The Exchange Council (constituted as described in the previous section) assumed 
the responsibility to propose listing for Ministerial approval. This represented a politicization of listings that would 
be severely criticized both in terms of slowness of process and for governmental meddling41. In the parliamentary 
proposal for this law, it was generally accepted that the government could assure the elimination of speculative 
excess42.  
 Ten years later, Law 3632 of 1928 revised again listing requirements for shares. The size of capital 
required for listing was raised to 5 million drachmas (13,427 gold sovereigns) and annual financial statements for 
at least three years prior to listing were mandated; however companies whose capital exceeded 10 million (26,852 
gold sovereigns) were allowed to present only one year’s financial accounts. The increase in capital size was only 
nominal. In gold sovereign terms (see also Appendix G) the change in required capital represented a substantial 
reduction in real terms. This accords with evidence we present in sections IV.A on the size of companies being 
                                                          
39 Burhop, 'New Stock Issues in Germany, 1882-1892' provides an interesting example on the significance of paid up shares. Specifically 
between 1870 and 1884, the minimum face value of a share was 300 Mark and only 40% of it had to be paid up before the IPO. This means 
that the minimum investment to buy one share was 120 Mark. The 1884 corporate law increased the minimum face value of a share to 1,000 
Mark and an IPO was only possible for fully paid-up shares.  
40 Law 1308/1918, art.18, Papadimos, 'Collection of Stock Exchange Law', p.74. 
41 See Parliamentary introduction to the later Law 3632/1928.  
42 Parliamentary introduction to Law 1308/1918, Papadimos, ibid. 
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listed in ASE. In addition, candidate companies had to provide information about their shareholdings and their 
history of capital increases prior to listing43. Thus, evidence of dispersion of ownership and tradability made its 
way back onto the complement of listing requirements. Law 3632 of 1928 rebalanced the power of decision over 
listings. It vested the Exchange Council with decision-making authority for listings, abolishing direct ministerial 
power, but maintaining at the same time the limits on brokers’ influence. The Council became a ‘listing authority’ 
that could act speedily and expertly on admissions to trading. It is worth repeating that, like its predecessors, this 
more sophisticated law included no explicit regulation of public offers of shares. The conduct of public offers 
continued to be unregulated until after the Second World War.  
 
III. Exchange Listings and IPOs 1880 to 1940: The Impact of the Environment 
 
A. The Comprehensive Data 
Using archival data from the files of the ASE and the National Bank of Greece, press reports and Exchange 
bulletins we have put together Table 5 that shows new listings and initial public offerings of equity shares in the 
years 1880-1940. In Figure 3 we show number of listings and IPOs per year. 
The data in Figure 3 show two general characteristics. The first is that listings by far exceeded IPOs 
throughout the period. Over the 60 years (1880-1940) there are 165 new listings of companies and of those only 21 
conducted concurrent IPOs. Thus, market development was based on listings, primarily. Secondly, there is a strong 
movement of ebb and flow over the years in the process of listing. There are periods of little or no listing activity 
and other periods with a rapid pace of new listings. Finally, we note that 1925 is an ‘outlier year’ when both listings 
and IPOs were very numerous compared to the entire period. We come back to this in section VI. 
It is important to note that visible jumps in listing activity preceded the changes in listing requirements in 
1918 and 1928. Both major legal changes in 1918 and 1928 occurred after episodes of rapid price increases that 
were followed by subsequent rapid declines. So legal changes occurred in the midst (or towards the end) of periods 
when listing activity was strong and continuous. Our basic observation is therefore that development was not led by 
legal change but rather by an autonomous demand for listings. Demand for listings was linked to economic 
conditions and expectations. In fact, the economic and political environment was in constant turmoil. Over the sixty 
years from 1880 to 1940, Greece was embroiled in two world wars, four local wars and two sovereign 
bankruptcies. It also experienced remarkable periods of growth. It is impossible to gain an understanding of the 
movement of listings and IPOs without a broader history review, since shifts were not random but, to a large 
extent, historically conditioned. 
                                                          
43 Art. 19 of Law 3632/1928 see, Keramidas, ‘Stock Exchanges’, p.36. 
14 
 
2
1 1 1
2
1 1 1
3 3
2
1
2
3
1
3
4
2
1
3
4
3 3
4
2
4 4
8
10
8
7
5
9
1
2 2
6
2
5
6
8
3
1 3
1 1 1
1
1
1
7
2
1
1
3
4
1 1
2
1 1 1 1
3
1
3
2
1 1
2
4
1
3
4
2
1
3
5
4
3
4
2
4 4
8
17
10
8
5
9
2 2 2
6
2
5
6
8
3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
1
1
8
8
2
1
8
8
3
1
8
8
4
1
8
8
5
1
8
8
6
1
8
8
7
1
8
8
8
1
8
8
9
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
1
1
8
9
2
1
8
9
3
1
8
9
4
1
8
9
5
1
8
9
6
1
8
9
7
1
8
9
8
1
8
9
9
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
1
1
9
0
2
1
9
0
3
1
9
0
4
1
9
0
5
1
9
0
6
1
9
0
7
1
9
0
8
1
9
0
9
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
1
1
9
1
2
1
9
1
3
1
9
1
4
1
9
1
5
1
9
1
6
1
9
1
7
1
9
1
8
1
9
1
9
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
1
1
9
2
2
1
9
2
3
1
9
2
4
1
9
2
5
1
9
2
6
1
9
2
7
1
9
2
8
1
9
2
9
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
1
1
9
3
2
1
9
3
3
1
9
3
4
1
9
3
5
1
9
3
6
1
9
3
7
1
9
3
8
1
9
3
9
1
9
4
0
N
o
 o
f 
li
st
in
g
s,
 I
P
O
s 
&
 t
o
ta
ls
Year
Figure 3. No of Listings, No of IPOs & Total no of firms launchd on the ASE during the period 1880-1940
No of listings  No  IPOs No of listings & IPOs  
 
 Before embarking on the historical review we must ponder the distinction between listing with and without 
a public offering of shares, as this is a dominant characteristic of the data in Appendix B. The question is what 
incentive was there to list, if immediate access to external equity finance was not sought simultaneously. The 
question becomes even sharper if we recall that the Exchange was not a monopolistic trading venue but coexisted 
and competed with the ‘free market’ for more than half the period. If listing simply meant access to trading 
liquidity for company owners, the ‘free market’ was available and apparently quite active. So what would a firm 
gain by listing (but not raising capital concurrently) on the Exchange?  
 Two conjectures fit the qualitative evidence. First, the attainment of listing requirement was a reputational 
signal for the company being listed, since successful examination by Exchange authorities offered a type of 
‘certification’, something that could not exist for the ‘free market’44. Second, companies that obtained listing could 
exploit their new visibility to proceed to subsequent capital increases by secondary offers, after establishing a track 
record on the Exchange. This implies that listings were not ‘stand-alone’ decisions but part of a process at the end 
of which external equity capital was indeed raised45. Contemporaries also noted that listings at times of high 
inflation enabled inflation adjustment to company capital. Indeed, for a large portion of the period under study 
                                                          
44 The certification function is normally attributed to underwriters in the modern literature. In the context of the Greek market no formal 
underwriting arrangements have been recorded. Listing and tradability of shares could also increase their value as collateral for borrowing 
from banks. 
45 See Appendix D below for data on capital increases that took place soon after listing. See also Derrien and Kesckes, 'The Initial Public 
Offerings of listed firms'.  
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inflation was high. In any case, although listing was not contemporaneous to an offer of new shares, it could act as 
a precondition to one. In addition, the low liquidity in the overall economy must have also contributed to this result.  
 In this connection, the benefits of Exchange listing include the condition that access to the market trading 
facilities subsequent funding, supports the creation of a market for the company's shares, boosts liquidity and 
broadens the shareholder base46.  
 
 B. The period of rising globalization: 1880-1913 
Although Greek history has many turning points in the period of study, it is useful to follow an 
internationally accepted periodization: The period is divided in two parts using 1914, the year of outbreak of WWI, 
as a dividing point. The first period, 1880-1913, includes the years of rising globalization. The second period, 
1914-1940, includes war years, post-war adjustment and the crisis of the 1930s47. In this and the next section we 
provide a history review for Greek developments, in order to underscore particular aspects that, beyond the 
international trends, conditioned the development of the Exchange, and more particularly listing activity.  
The last twenty years of the 19th century witnessed a great cycle in Greek economic fortunes. In 1878 
Greece had, as said, regained access to international markets and a large inflow of borrowed funds occurred, giving 
a visible boost to liquidity, investment and general economic activity. The 1880s saw the launching of major 
infrastructural projects, railroads, roads and the Corinth Canal, leading to feverish construction activity. Several of 
these very visible projects were included in the list of early IPOs conducted on the Exchange, as we shall see 
presently.  
The increasing burden of public debt and the intensification of military spending however, produced a 
fiscal crisis in the late 1880s. International lending also became much restricted after the Baring Crisis and the 
Argentine default in 1892. Greece followed, defaulting in 1893. In the ensuing years the drachma devalued 
substantially and import tariffs were imposed, eventually boosting domestic production and exports. However, war 
with Turkey broke out in 1897 with disastrous consequences: besides the demoralization of defeat, Greece 
undertook heavy reparation payments to Turkey. The country’s public finances were placed under International 
Financial Control in 189848.  
 In the years after the sovereign default, protection and devaluation had a positive impact on domestic 
production. The reflection of these movements is observable on the ASE and a changing composition of listings in 
the early years of the twentieth century.  
                                                          
46 Flandreau, 'Bonds and brands: Foundations of sovereign debt markets, 1820-1830'. 
47 O’Rourke and Williamson, 'Globalization and history, the evolution of nineteenth century atlantic economy' and Berend 'An economic  
history of Twentieth Century'. 
48 On the IFC see Dertilis, 'History of the modern Greek state 1830-1920', pp.575-78 and Newspaper ‘Tychi’ [Fortune], May 1st, 1898 and 
June 1st,1898. 
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 New listings on the Exchange were quite numerous in the 1880s and the 1890s with eight listings in the 
first and ten in the second decade. In the 1880s, the characteristic was the promotion of infrastructure investments 
and military production: of eight companies listed, three were railroads two were construction firms and one was a 
powder and explosives company. In the 1890s listings were more diversified reflecting the acceleration of domestic 
production: listed companies were active in energy, shipping, textiles, machine tools. Thus, we observe the first 
appearance of ‘industrial stocks’ on the Exchange. The largest company listed during this period, was a bank, the 
Bank of Athens. In these two decades, and as compared to 15 new listings, there were 5 IPOs. They reflected the 
trends of the time: a munitions manufacturer, two railroad companies, a bank and a company managing public land 
rents.  
 The years following international financial control of public finances represent one of the most turbulent 
periods in the country’s economic history. Fiscal adjustment was gradually achieved and the drachma followed a 
path of revaluation in the early years of the new century, reaching parity with the golden franc and maintaining this 
parity until 1918. The balance of payments improved especially with the emergence of remittances from emigrants 
and shipping, which constituted a fresh source of domestic liquidity49. The country regained confidence with new 
and more technologically advanced firms making their appearance, and showing up in Exchange listings, as we 
discuss presently. Spearheaded by an officers’ revolt in 1909, a new government promoted broad modernization in 
an open-economy context. It would be fair to characterize the first decade of the twentieth century as a period of 
peace and recovery with fiscal and monetary stability. This would soon change however. 
 With new confidence vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, which was disintegrating, Greece went to war in 1912-
13 and the victorious outcome saw a doubling of its territory to the north and the south (with the union of Crete) 
and a near-doubling of its population50. This signified a large extension of its internal market, a factor that would 
play a significant role in the ensuing period.  
 The Stock Exchange experienced a boom during this period, in the years 1904-6, when recovery and 
currency revaluation had entrenched themselves51. Leading sectors in the listings were banks, steamship 
companies, cement companies and the first Greek electric utility. Steamship companies represented the most 
export-oriented sector of the time. Overall, the decade of stability (1900-10) saw the foundation of larger 
companies, undertaking new investments and seeking greater efficiency. 
 As a notable feature of quickened listing activity, new banks were systematically emerging. One factor was 
the large increase in inflows of foreign exchange in the form of remittances from recent Greek emigrants and from 
shipping. These provided a new source of private liquidity. Foreign private investments also made their appearance 
                                                          
49  See Repoulis 'A Study and Law Proposal on Emigration'; Riginos, 'Conjoncture et Industrialisation en Grece 1900-1940', pp. 125-14. 
50 A distinct peculiarity of Greece as a nation-state in the 19th century was that most ethnic Greeks lived outside its borders. Thus expansion 
was pursued as a goal of ‘liberation’ and national integration.  
51 ‘Oikonomika Chronika’ (Economic Chronicles, 1904-6) See Appendix G on currency revaluation in years 1900-1910.  
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during the decade, directed especially to new banking ventures52. Arguably, the listing of banks was an indicator of 
the broader entrepreneurial climate in the Exchange and the economy. In 1900-1913 there were 24 listings and only 
three IPOs. All three were conducted by new banks (Bank of Crete, Bank of Anatolia and Commercial Bank) and 
occurred before 1910.  
 
C. The period of wars, the ‘roaring twenties’ and world crisis: 1914-1940 
 Greece joined the Entente in WWI and obtained further territorial gains. The period of 1916-19 was, 
despite the war, one of economic optimism for the future of an enlarged nation. However, the war for Greece did 
not end in 1918. The country became embroiled in war with Turkey in Asia Minor in 1920 ending in defeat for 
Greece in 1922. That defeat brought another kind of expansion: almost a million and a half of Asia Minor Greeks 
were forced to move to Greece as refugees. This huge and sudden ‘population shock’ was initially debilitating and 
had dire fiscal consequences, coping with a huge resettlement effort. The ten years of almost continuous war had, 
as expected, forced new fiscal imbalance, monetary financing of budgets, drachma devaluation and inflation of the 
order of 8-55 percent annually in the period after the war. 
 Inflation and domestic demand dominated the motives for company formations and listings, in this period, 
devaluation and trade protectionism boosted the emergence of enterprises that catered to the domestic market and 
this happened inevitably during the ten-year period of Greek engagement in wars.  
 The ‘population shock’ of 1922 was experienced as a disaster by the uprooted but became a sort of growth 
engine for the economy. Asia Minor Greeks were skilled and enterprising, and they soon sought new ventures in 
their new home. Furthermore, public spending (including foreign aid) on refugee assistance expanded domestic 
demands for food, clothing and housing. After the end of the wars, the pace of growth picked up; 1923-29 was a 
distinct episode of rapid development in recent Greek history. Inflation also continued but was on the whole much 
lower than the earlier decade, averaging an annual rate of 13 percent in the years 1924-2753. In 1928 Greece, under 
pressure from international donors, undertook monetary stabilization, pegged the drachma to the British pound 
sterling (which adhered to the Gold Exchange Standard) and created a central bank, the Bank of Greece, to oversee 
and execute monetary policy54. Once again Greece became a full participant in the international monetary system, 
except that the system itself proved short-lived.  
 The 1929 crash in the New York market ushered in a period of general financial crisis and depression. On 
September 21, 1931 the pound sterling went off the gold standard and the Greek government closed down the 
Exchange and all trading in foreign exchange. In April 1932, Greece itself abandoned the gold exchange standard 
and declared official default on its public debt. The Exchange did not reopen until December of that year. 
Following most advanced countries Greece instituted once again protectionist measures. The crisis was not as harsh 
                                                          
52 Kostis, ‘History of the National Bank of Greece 1914-1940'. 
53 Riginos, M., 'Conjoncture et Industrialisation en Grece 1900-1940', pp. 136-141. 
54 Bank of Greece, ‘The first fifty years of the Bank of Greece,1928-1978’. 
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in Greece as in most advanced industrial economies. Under the protectionist regime, the economy picked up and 
local manufacturing was energized55. This moderate but upward economic trend would be finally interrupted with 
the eruption of the WWII in 193956.  
 In the 1920s, especially after 1924, the Exchange experienced another boom and an unprecedented record 
in new listings. In total 71 companies were admitted to trading in this period, of which most prominent were 
banking firms with 15 listings, textiles with 12, construction with 8, chemicals and food each with 7 new listings. 
This listing activity represented about 50 percent of all listings since the Exchange’s inception and would not be 
encountered again until postwar booms in the 1970s and the 1990s. In the ensuing decade of the 1930s, new listings 
would continue but at a much reduced pace, with 33 new admissions to trading, with textile firms covering about 
one third of that number. A very interesting feature of the 1930s was that the financial stabilization of the late 
twenties and the financial crisis of the thirties led to the failure or merger of many of the new banks that had 
emerged during the boom of the 1920s57.                          
 As compared to the record 104 new listings in this sub-period, 11 IPOs were conducted. All of those took 
place until 1930 and a long stoppage in IPO activity ensued that covered the whole decade of the 1930s. Nine IPOs 
represented offers of manufacturing stocks, one was conducted by a construction company and one by the newly 
established central bank. This is the period of the clear rise of industrial finance through the Exchange. Aside from 
this significant shift however, the number of IPOs as a proportion of total listings actually declined as compared to 
earlier periods58. 
 
Please Insert Figure 4 about here  
 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of listings and IPOs, along with their sectoral composition, of the two subperiods. 
The large growth of listings in the second sub-period is accompanied by a visible increase in the sectoral 
diversification. This is mostly, a diversification that encompassed the rise of manufacturing firms.  
 
D. Hypotheses on new listings and Greek economic change 
Our general conjecture that listing activity on the Exchange was conditioned by growth expectations and 
prospects, lends itself to statistical testing with plausible explanatory variables, available for Greece. We utilize 
new listings as percent of total listings (NLTL) as our dependent variable. The hypothesis about its determining 
factors is that indices of economic state and change affect listing activity59. 
                                                          
55 Kostis, 'History of the National Bank of Greece 1914-1940’.  
56 Bank of Greece, ibid. 
57 We have recorded nine de-listings of banks in the 1930s. 
58 Although IPOs were sparse, capital needs were actually huge. Funding through the Stock Exchange during the 1920s took place in the 
form of capital increases conducted by already listed companies. This strengthens our conjecture that listing was sought as a precondition for 
later capital gathering through sale of seasoned stocks. See section E for specifics. 
59 Doidge et al., 'The U.S. Left behind: The rise of IPO activity around the world' use GDP growth in a similar connection relating to IPO 
activity’. 
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Available Greek data are GDP and population, the breakdown of GDP into primary, secondary and tertiary 
sector outputs and the rate of drachma devaluation; we compute per capita output (GDPpc), output growth rates 
(G1, G2, G3) for the economy, the secondary (manufacturing) and the tertiary (service) sectors respectively; 
devaluation is estimated by the annual change in the exchange rate of the drachma to the gold sovereign.  
Each of the three estimated variables represents economic conditions. Per capita GDP can proxy for 
disposable income and the potential demand for stocks; growth rates represent expansion of economic 
opportunities. The currency devaluation can proxy for prospects for profit expansion of domestic manufactures.  
All three can potentially be positive drivers of new listings. We form a simple time-series model to test our 
hypothesis. 
NLTL  =  c  +  α (GDPpc)  +  β DEV  +  γ (G)  +  ε      (1). 
 
According to the hypothesis α, β, γ > (=) 0.  
We explore the differentiation of this model across the two subperiods. As we have already explained, in the first 
subperiod the Exchange was more open to international influences but in the second, it was inward – looking, with 
firms primarily oriented towards the internal market. As a consequence, we expect that domestic growth played a 
differential role in listing activity in the second subperiod, as compared to the earlier one.  
The findings from the estimation of this regression are presented in section VI below.  
 
IV. Listings and IPOs: Frequency, Size and Quasi-IPOs  
   In this section we present quantitative evidence on listings and IPOs, as they evolved over the 60 years 
under study. We address two related research questions. The first relates to size and age of the firms admitted to 
listing. Did the Exchange evolve towards a trading venue for small and/or young firms or did it remain the 
mainstay of established insiders? From a broader perspective this is relevant to the contribution of the Exchange to 
enterprise development and economic change.  
 The second question relates to whether simple listings were actually ‘IPOs in waiting’, i.e. listings that 
were quickly followed by a capital increase. The critical issues in this question are visibility and disclosure. If IPOs 
were rare because disclosure was inadequate, capital increases after listing could act as near-substitutes, after the 
firm had shown a track record on the Exchange. We collect data on all cases where a listing was followed, within a 
period of two years, by an issue of new shares. We consider these as ‘quasi IPOs’ and compare them to actual IPOs 
and their features. The inclusion of ‘quasi-IPOs’ offers a more accurate assessment of the role of the Exchange in 
the financing of firms considering, that pure IPOs may have been avoided due to the persistent lack of IPO 
regulation and mandatory disclosure. 
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Α. The size and age of listed companies 
Given the multi-faceted economic conditions during the long sixty years that we described, the 
examination of basic features acquires significance since it allows an evolutionary perspective. We saw that in the 
early decades there was emphasis on infra-structural projects, which were necessarily large, visible and 
government-promoted. Manufacturing came later and its growth was largely spurred by expanding domestic 
market potential. As the type and scale of undertakings by firms changed we expect changes in size overtime.   
 In the case of simple listings, we measure size by the nominal value of the stock at the time of listing. In 
the case of IPOs we measure the magnitude of the actual offer, defined as the number of shares offered times the 
offer price. Age is uniformly measured as the number of years between the founding of a company and the time of 
listing. 
  Table 3 shows the means of size and age for both simple listings and IPOs. In panel A, the estimates are 
shown for the whole period. In panels B-C the estimates are shown for each sub-period.  
 
Please insert Table 3 about here 
 We first note that the average size of IPO offerings exceeds by far the average size of firms that obtain 
simple listing. This is easy to interpret: IPOs were necessarily used when capital needs were high and could not be 
satisfied by recourse to narrow networks of capital providers or private resources of original owners. Thus, within 
the IPO dataset there are a few very large placements. Yet, as already noted, listings by far exceeded IPOs in 
number, the latter being a small minority. Looking at the sub-periods, we note that whereas in the early period 
1880-1913, IPOs represented almost 20 percent of all new listings, in the subsequent period the share of IPOs fell 
to about 11 percent. We conclude that the growth of the primary market was stunted and did not keep pace with the 
general and considerable expansion of the market as a trading venue. This brings forth the importance of the quasi-
IPOs that we take up in the next section. 
  The estimates in Panels B-C show a clear tendency for reduction in size over time, both for simple 
listing and IPOs. This is consistent with the conjecture that new sectors and smaller undertakings were gaining 
access to the Exchange over time. At the same time the average and especially the median age of listed firms were 
relatively low (3-5 years) and did not show considerable change over time. Thus, we conclude that the Exchange 
was not the mainstay of established insiders but a venue for trading shares of smaller and relatively young firms. 
This is not unexpected in a small and relatively young country in an early stage of development.  
 
B. IPOs and Quasi-IPOs 
We characterize as a quasi-IPO the case where a firm announces a capital increase soon after listing, 
offering sale of new shares for cash. If the time of the capital increase is indeed close to that of listing, the strategy 
comes close to this being a delayed IPO, rather than a truly ‘seasoned’ offering. We must recall that in the Greek 
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context underwriting was not a developed institutional arrangement with all the regulatory requirements of the 
present day. The primary sale of shares was unregulated and issuers were the main decision-makers. Disclosure 
quality at the time of listing was probably low. The function of certification, which in the modern literature is 
attributed to underwriters, was vested in the seal of approval offered by the listing authority itself. Thus a quasi-
IPO would benefit from both the certification of the listing decision and the acquisition of visibility through 
trading. Unfortunately, there is little or no evidence of trading activity, so it is not possible to distinguish firms 
which acquired a trading track record quickly after being listed. Instead, we have imposed a reasonable time limit 
of two years as a period during which some trading record is acquired but also in which the listing certification 
retains validity as a reputational asset. Listed firms which engaged in capital increases within two years of listing 
are here considered as quasi-IPOs. Appendix D includes a list of quasi-IPOs that took place over the period.  
In Table 4 and Appendixes D and E we show descriptive statistics for quasi-IPOs and IPOs for the whole 
period and by sub-period. Size now describes the size of the offer in all cases. Data are classified by the date of 
listing, not by the date of ensuing capital increase in the case of quasi-IPOs.  
 
Please insert Table 4 about here 
 
 As shown in Table 4, 42 quasi-IPOs were performed over the period, double the number of IPOs. 
However, total capital raised through these quasi-IPOs amounted to about 1.6 million gold sovereigns, less than 
half the aggregate amount raised by IPOs (3.5 million gold sovereigns). Thus, it appears that quasi-IPOs were 
chosen smaller under-takings; these cases were probably more needful of the certification and the visibility 
provided by an Exchange listing, before attempting to raise funds. The relation of IPOs and Quasi-IPOs is strongly 
reversed over the two sub-periods, as we observe from panels B and C of the Table 4. During 1880-1913, quasi-
IPOs were fewer than IPOs and smaller in terms of capital raised. On the contrary, in the period 1914-1940, quasi-
IPOs were far more numerous than IPOs, and, although they represented smaller offerings on average, they led to 
about the same total capital absorption as IPOs. In an era when smaller and younger firms were admitted to listing, 
the implied usefulness of listing as a certification mechanism was clearly stronger. Thus, one conclusion is that 
especially smaller firms used Exchange listing as a precondition for raising funds after having gained access to 
market trading. This implies that the supply of securities in actual IPOs understated the true demand for capital by 
new firms and this demand became manifest shortly after listing, for smaller firms. Listing itself as a ‘certification’ 
signal facilitated the supply of new capital in an environment in which mandatory and uniform disclosure 
requirements were not enforced. 
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V. Was there IPO underpricing on the Athens Stock Exchange? 
A. Theoretical Justifications 
The underpricing of primary offerings of securities has been extensively researched in modern markets, 
both developed and emerging60. The phenomenon of placements, where offer prices are systematically lower than 
subsequent trading prices, has drawn much attention because it constitutes an anomaly within the framework of 
efficient markets.  This anomaly has spurred a large amount of research both in theory and history.  
Theoretical explorations of underpricing have revolved around several basic themes. Ljungquist61 has 
reviewed theories, focused either on the demand side or the supply side of primary markets: Demand theories 
devolve on the asymmetry of information between issuers and external investors, on one hand, and behavioral 
factors summarized into the concept of ‘investor sentiment’, on the other. Supply theories are underpinned by 
institutional factors (e.g. law, regulation, financial practices) and/or strategic theories (e.g. controlling the ex-post 
shareholder base). Recognizing that regulation and institutional arrangements were absent in 19th century Greece, 
we mostly draw on ideas from demand theories. Asymmetry may lead to an underpricing equilibrium in a market 
with uninformed investors. Investor sentiment presumes over-enthusiasm of buyers in the after-market of the 
offering. In fact, both aspects can be linked since the appearance of sentiment is more likely when asymmetry of 
information is more acute.   
Historical studies of large stock exchanges have also focused on IPO underpricing. Several studies in the 
19th and 20th centuries find that IPO underpricing varied over the long term. In fact, it appears to have been either 
absent or very small in magnitude, in markets such as London and Berlin during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Numerous studies62 have noted that the increase in underpricing occurred overtime in spite of 
improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of IPO underwriters.  
 
B. Pricing in the Athens Stock Exchange 
 
The question in this section is whether underpricing actually occurred on the ASE during our period of 
study and if anything can be said about its determinants. In our case, the number of observed IPOs is limited to 21 
                                                          
60 See Ritter, 'The hot issue market of 1980'; Ljungquist, 'IPO underpricing’; Thomadakis et. al., 'Collateral regulation and IPO specific 
liberalization: The case of price limits in the Athens Stock Exchange'.  
61 Ljungquist, 'IPO underpricing’. 
62 See Burhop, 'The underpricing of initial public offerings at the berlin stock exchange, 1870-96'; Chambers, 'Gentlemanly capitalism 
revisited: A case study of underpricing of initial public offerings on the London stock exchange, 1946–1986'; Lehman, ‘Underwriter activity 
and performance of Initial Public Offerings in Imperial Germany between 1897-1914: The role of reputation'; Chambers, 'Going public in 
interwar Britain'; Fohlin 'Asymmetric information, market power, and the underpricing of new stock issues in Germany, 1882-1892'; Fohlin 
and Reinold, 'Common stock returns in the pre-WWI Berlin stock exchange'; Chambers, 'Going public in interwar Britain'; Burhop et al., 
'Regulating IPOs: Evidence from going public in London, 1900-1913'; Lehmann, 'Taking firms to the stock market: IPOs and the importance 
of large banks in imperial Germany, 1896-1913'. In their seminal study of the London Exchange, Chambers and Dimson, 'IPO underpricing 
over the very long run'. 
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and so small a population can hardly support stringent statistical testing. We nevertheless marshal evidence from 
descriptive statistics, simple correlations and qualitative observation.   
In order to measure underpricing accurately, we compare the offer price of shares in each IPO with the 
shares’ first trading price observed from daily press bulletins. Having no estimates of a market index on a daily 
basis, we have undertaken a market-return adjustment as follows: for each IPO we isolate two dates: the last day of 
the offer and the first day of trading. Further, we draw from the daily press all shares that traded on both dates and 
compute a simple average return of the portfolio composed of these shares. Thus, for each IPO we have a return for 
a matching portfolio with the same trading dates. We use this return as a proxy for ‘market return’ (MPR) and 
compute the market-adjusted return (MAIR) for each IPO as follows: 
   (2) 
where, CPi,1 is the first observed trading price of the newly distributed shares of IPO i; OPi,0 is the offering price of 
IPO i; MPR (i) is the matching portfolio return for IPO i. In Table 5 we present descriptive statistics of the 
computed MAIR.  
 
Please insert Table 5 around here 
 
In order to gauge possible determinants of underpricing we examine popular proxies, found in empirical 
work with strong theoretical justification and measurable from our data set. These include age and size63 and the 
percent of given ownership by pre-IPO owners. Size and age proxy for asymmetric information between issuer and 
investors (older and larger firms offer better information and are less underpriced). Monitoring incentives are taken 
to increase with the number of shares sold by the original owner at the time of the IPO. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2003) show that first-day returns are lower, the greater are the monitoring incentives of the issuing firms’ 
decision-makers. 
 Size is measured as the size of the offer, i.e. the number of issued shares times the offer price. Offer prices 
are expressed in gold sovereigns throughout. Age of the company at the time of the public offering is measured by 
the difference in years between the date of establishment and the date of the public offering. Finally given 
ownership (GO) measures the percentage of equity ownership offered to the public at the time of the offering.  
 From the estimates in Table 5, it is seen that, on average, underpricing is evident only in the second 
subperiod 1914-1940, whereas in the early years it appears that offers were overpriced.  It can also be seen from the 
Table that in terms of possible explanatory variables, average size of offerings exhibits a dramatic decline between 
                                                          
63 See Ritter, 'The hot issue market of 1980'; Megginson and Weiss, 'Venture capitalist in initial public offerings'; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 
'IPO pricing in the dot-com bubbles: Complacency or incentives', Chambers and Dimson, 'IPO underpricing over the very long run'; Lehman 
'Taking firms to the stock market: IPOs and the importance of large banks in imperial Germany, 1896-1913'. 
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the two subperiods. We examine simple correlations between MAIR and the three possible explanatory variables 
by means of univariate regressions. Results are discussed below in section VI. 
      
VI. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we present the empirical results of estimations undertaken on earlier hypotheses regarding 
new listings and IPO underpricing Table 6 shows the estimation of regression (4) on the determination of new 
listings that is repeated here for clarity. 
 
NLTL  =  c  +  α (GDPpc)  +  β (DEV)  +  γ (G)  +  ε      (4). 
 
We conduct the estimation of (1) using alternately G1, G2 and G3 (growth rates of overall GDP and of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors respectively) as the growth factor. We also estimate the same regressions separately 
for the two sub-periods.  In Table 6 we show the result of estimations64.  
 
Please insert Table 6 around here  
 
These results indicate that when the whole period is examined there is no strong explanatory factor on new 
listings. GDP growth appears as a positive determinant in one of the regressions and the rate of devaluation appears 
as a weak negative determinant. Looking at subperiod estimations however, we note a substantial difference 
between the earlier and later one. In the first subperiod no independent variable is significant. In the second 
subperiod however growth rates exhibit significance, especially the growth rate of manufacturing emerges as the 
more  positive and significant factor. This provides statistical confirmation to our qualitative conjecture that, in the 
second subperiod, exchange development was energized by the expansion of Greece’s internal market.  
The next set of estimations is a series of correlations represented as univariate bootstrapped regressions. 
The small size of the population of IPOs remains of course a barrier to statistical testing of higher stringency (e.g. 
multiple cross-sectional regression) but our goal is to gather as many indications as possible from this admittedly 
small set of observations.  
The following univariate bootstrapped regressions are estimated: 
 
           MAIR = A1 + β1 LnSIZE + e1             (5a) 
             A2 + β2 Ln(1+AGE) + e2      (5b) 
                                                                  A3 + β3 GO + e3                     (5c) 
                                                          
64 As there are anomalies in the time series due to zero new listings in some years, we have used the technique of «bootstrapping» to enhance 
the quality of estimation. This method makes use of the empirical distribution function to derive an “approximating distribution” of the 
observed data. This can be implemented by constructing a number of resamples with replacement, of the observed dataset (and of equal size 
to the observed dataset). The same method can also be used in the univariate regressions of section B, Fox, ‘Applied Regression Analysis 
and Generalized Linear Models’.  
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Coefficient estimates for β1, β2, β3 show the correlation of each variable to MAIR. Although general 
conclusions cannot be drawn about the determinants of MAIR from univariate regressions, we can at least gauge if 
the direction of the correlation accords with extant theory and empirical evidence. Table 6 exhibits these results.  
 
Please insert Table 7 about here 
 The only observation of significance in Table 7 is that the size of an IPO correlates negatively to estimated 
MAIR. This is in line with a long list of findings in the literature and accords with the view that larger size (and 
visibility) signifies lower information asymmetry. However, neither age nor the percentage of given ownership 
exhibit strong correlation to MAIR, so that no indications can be gauged about these popular proxies. 
 Looking more closely into the composition of the data (Table 4 and Table 5), we note a striking 
concentration of IPOs in the year 1925. Seven IPOs (a third of the total number over the period) were conducted in 
that year. The average size of these IPOs was 11,090 Gold Sovereign. Their average underpricing is estimated at 
301.89%, a level not found at any other time within our study period. Simple listings attained their maximum 
number in the same year, in which stock prices also peaked. It thus appears that 1925 was a very special year that 
affords a rare glimpse into a ‘hot period’ of the Athens Stock Exchange and Greek conditions of liquidity. In our 
dataset, 1925 was the first year of IPO activity after a long pause. The last IPO had taken place 7 years before, in 
1918. Independent research into Greek fiscal and monetary conditions of the time indicates that the ‘hot listing 
period’ was very probably connected with macroeconomic factors. 1922 was the critical year of Greek defeat and 
the Asia Minor refugee crisis. Historical research indicates that the post-1922 period was one of monetary 
expansion and inflation that led to decreases in both the real wage and the real interest rate, thus enabling higher 
profitability65. Increasing profitability is repeatedly mentioned in contemporary press reports as a cause of the IPO 
boom of 192566.  
Furthermore, 1926 marked a sharp turn (also mentioned in the contemporary press) towards restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies. As Christodoulaki notes: “The timing of this change in economic performance is 
located in late 1925 and early 1926 when pressure to improve the fiscal performance of the government and to 
follow contractionary monetary policies in order to stabilize the drachma was increased”67. The peak in IPO 
activity observed in 1925 could be therefore attributed to a confluence of factors: long pent up demand, high stock 
market valuations and expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. It is indicative that within those conditions it was 
mostly small firms oriented to the domestic market that sought and gained admission to market for capital-raising. 
As compared to the early large IPOs of the 19th century, this represented a true reversal in primary market direction. 
 
                                                          
65 Christodoulaki, 'Industrial growth in Greece between the wars: A new perspective'. 
66 Newspaper ‘Oikonomologos’ [Economist], October 23, 1926. 
67 Christodoulaki, 'Industrial growth in Greece between the wars: A new perspective' p. 80. 
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
The development of the ASE from its inception (1880) to the outbreak of the Second World War (1940) 
was an active process that went through several turns as Greek economic events passed through episodes of 
growth, sovereign bankruptcy, war and expansion. An important milestone for the character of the Exchange was 
the end of the era of globalization in 1913. The Exchange evolved from a trading venue for government paper and 
equities of large infra-structural government-sponsored projects to a market offering access to small manufacturing 
firms pursuing indigenous ventures in mostly consumer goods and construction. Thus, the Exchange underwent 
‘democratization’ from elite large projects to grass-root private initiatives. 
Over the period, the Exchange accepted 165 new equity listings, besides the mandatory listing of 
government bonds. The Stock market experienced several ‘hot’ periods of listing activity and peaking prices. In the 
first three decades of its operation as a trading venue, the Exchange competed with a free market that operated 
informally alongside the official Exchange. The fact that listing activity was robust even under the competition of a 
‘free’ market testifies to the value of Exchange listing as a type of certification that added value and visibility to 
listed entities. 
The Exchange’s role as a primary market for capital-rising through IPOs was limited, however. Only 13 
percent of the firms that attained listing over this long period actually performed IPOs. Another 25 percent chose to 
increase their capital by public offers within two years after acquiring listed status. The explanation of low IPO 
activity could be due initially to the traumatic effects of an IPO bubble in the 1870s, before a formal Exchange had 
been organized. However, even when the effects of the early bubble became a distant memory, IPO activity still 
remained sparse. This could be the result of insufficient liquidity in an emerging economy but was also related in 
our view to the lack of regulation, especially adequate provisions for disclosure and IPO quality that could inspire 
trust to investors. 
Focusing on the parallel activity of quasi-IPOs (capital raising performed within two years of listing) we 
found that it was more widely used than IPOs, especially in the 1920s, suggesting this was a less costly route for 
capital-gathering. The difference between IPOs and quasi-IPOs was that the latter had already obtained the stamp 
of approval of the listing authority and had established a trading record. Hence, whereas the same amount of capital 
raised in an IPO or a quasi-IPO made the same demands on liquidity, quasi-IPOs offered differential levels of 
information about the issuer and apparently met with different levels of investor trust. This was very important 
given the small size and the character of firms attempting to raise capital in the post-globalization era. 
It is notable that despite several public interventions in the early twentieth century on the governance 
structure of the Exchange, IPOs remained unregulated, investment banking services were not standardized and the 
quality of disclosure was low and uneven. This is probably the longer-term explanation of the relative weakness of 
the primary market. It must be clarified that there was no general absence of regulatory activity. Significant 
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regulatory changes did take place from 1918 to 1928, but they were focused on listing requirements, secondary 
trading and the duties of brokers, not on IPOs and investment banking.  
Examining the dataset of 21 IPOs undertaken over the period 1880-1940, we note a significant change in 
character and composition in those as well. Whereas banking IPOs appeared throughout the period, non-financial 
issues shifted from infrastructure-related projects and few heavy industry undertakings to light manufacturing 
ventures mainly oriented to the satisfaction of domestic demand. A notable reduction in the average size over time 
and a visible shift to severe underpricing of IPOs around the second decade of the twentieth century are evident 
trends. Analysis of pricing, revealed that reductions in size, increases in market liquidity and the occurrence of ‘hot 
market’ pressure were proximate causes of the emergence of underpricing.  
 In a more general historical assessment it appears that the ASE showed distinct features during the two 
sub-periods of this study. It grew in both sub-periods. In the period of rising globalization (1880-1913) the growth 
was realised through listings and IPOs of larger firms mainly oriented to infrastructures and banking, as we said. In 
the period of de-globalization that started with the First World War, and during which Greece experienced 
considerable growth of space and population, the Exchange developed with a clear orientation to the internal 
market: small and light manufacturing firms, smaller banks and construction. Thus, the Exchange responded to the 
major features of economic development in Greece. The large expansion of the domestic market offered renewed 
impetus to listing activity of firms catering to that domestic market. This was also a response to protracted war 
conditions that engendered a de facto protectionism.  
The second aspect of change in the post World War I and national wars period was the emergence of 
inflation and monetary instabilities. Our evidence shows a large increase in listing activity and IPOs in the 1920s, 
at a time when inflationary profits were making an appearance. These phenomena would come to an abrupt stop 
with restrictive policies enacted from 1926 onwards. Thus, indirectly, it appears that the abundance of monetary 
liquidity gave a boost to the Exchange both as a primary market and as a listing venue. This is clearly confirmed by 
our evidence.  
Finally, it is important to note that we have found evidence that listing activity was statistically related to to 
growth rates of the secondary (industrial) sector in the second subperiod, i.e. the period of internal market 
expansion. This is a significant finding, especially in conjunction with the clear tendency for small firms to list on 
the exchange in the second and third decades of the 20th century. The clear implication is that the Exchange became 
and remained an important venue for providing trading liquidity, and eventually finance, to emerging firms, until 
the outbreak of the Second World War. 
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Table 1: Capitalization of listed shares and bonds in the A.S.E. and number of securities for each asset category during 
the period 1880-1930 (calculated in the end of each decade)  
This table presents descriptive statistics on governmental and corporate bonds in Athens Stock Exchange between 1880 and 
1930. Specifically it provides details on capitalization of government bonds, number of government bonds, capitalization of 
corporate bonds, number of corporate bonds and number of listed shares 
Year 
(end of  
decade 
31.12) 
Capitalization 
of government 
bonds 
(in Gold Sov.) 
No of  
government  
bonds 
Capitalization 
of corporate 
bonds 
(in Gold Sov.) 
No of  
corporate  
bonds 
Capitalization 
of shares 
(in Gold Sov.) 
No of  
listing 
shares 
1880 6.775.925 8 1.577.042 1 3.379.715 10  
1890 16.882.709 7 2.981.906 1 5.938.114 13  
1900 26.697.662 9 3.112.514 12 4.924.628 20       
1910 20.611.488 12 5.941.822 14 12.207.369 27  
1920 18.510.309 18 5.356.224 18 20.216.870 45  
1930 71.819.308 33 2.483.051 18 17.926.594 101  
Source: Official Bulletins and Yearbooks of the Athens Stock Exchange (various years)  
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Table 2: Comparative evolution of number of listed companies per million people 
The number of listed companies per million people is the number of domestic companies whose equity is publicly traded in a 
domestic stock exchange divided by the population in millions. Sources of the data mainly come from Tables 3 & 5, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) and complementarily (which are noted with *) from Table 1, Musacchio & Turner (2013) 
              Number of Listed Companies per million people Stock Market Capitalization / GDP 
Country  1913 1929 1938 1913 1929 1938 
Argentina  15.29   0.17   
Australia  61.74 76.92 84.88 0.39 0.5 0.91 
Austria  38.72 42.62 30.06 0.76   
Belgium  108.7   0.99 1.31  
Brazil  12.43 9.85 5.17 0.25   
Canada  14.65   0.74  1,00 
Chile  20.62   0.17   
Cuba  12.69   2.19   
Denmark  38.22 54.86 85.25 0.36 0.17 0.25 
Egypt  16.58 13.44  1.09   
France  13.29  26.20 0.78  0.19 
Germany  27.96 19.73 10.91 0.44 0.35 0.18 
India 0.82 1.81 2.59 0.02 0.07 0.07 
Italy  6.32 6.40 3.11 0.17 0.23 0.26 
Japan  7.53 16.65 19.48 0.49 1.20 1.81 
Netherlands  65.87 95.48  0.56  0.74 
Norway  33.51 41.50 45.98 0.16 0.22 0.18 
Russia  2.02   0.18   
South Africa     0.22*   
Spain     0.31*   
Sweden  20.64 16.36 14.93 0.47 0.41 0.30 
Switzerland  61.53 67.80 55.46 0.58   
Uruguay*                            15.60*   0.16*   
United Kingdom  47.06   1.09 1.38 1.14 
United States  4.75 9.72 9.16 0.39 0.75 0.56 
Greece 5.81 15.99 12.78 0.42 0.21 0.14 
       
Common Law Av.* 25.80   0.55   
German Civil Law* 33.94   0.73   
French Civil Law* 28.74   0.37   
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Musacchio & Turner (Business History, 2013, Table 1, p.p.531-532) introduce also some different Stock Market Capitalization index numbers 
in 1913 for some countries comparing with Rajan and Zingales findings: In particular, for United Kingdom the given Stock Market 
Capitalization index is 0.98, for United States 0.39, for Switzerland 1.23, for Brazil 0.20, for Cuba 0.33, for Egypt 0.44, for France 0.54 and for 
Denmark 0.86. O’Sullivan (2007) report an average of 151 number of stocks traded in NYSE in 1885, 296 in 1900, 429 in 1915, 670 in 1920, 
775 in 1925 and 1,273 in 1930. The great majority of them were industrial shares (i.e. 1,033 out of 1,273 in 1930). O’Sullivan (2007) also 
underlines that in addition to the 151 companies that were listed in NYSE by 1885 there have been 249 firms listed in Boston Stock Exchange 
and 79 in Philadelphia. Further, Moody’s reported an aggregate market capitalization for the country’s leading trading markets of $81.97 
billion at the end of 1930 ($49 billion for the NYSE; $20 billion for the Curb and $13 billion for the remaining exchanges) which suggests a 
ratio of 91% based on a $90.4 billion figure for GDP for 1930 [Moody’s, Manual of Industrials (New York, 1933), appendix, p. 106]. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for Listings and IPOs 
This is a comparative table showing listings and Initial Public Offerings. AGE, is the age of the company in years on the listing 
date. Size measures the number of new issued shares offered to the public during the IPO procedure multiplied with their offer 
price in gold sovereigns. For simple listing it is nominal share value in gold sovereigns. Panel A presents the statistics for the entire 
period. On Panel B we concentrate on the period of rising globalization (1880-1913) during which the growth was realised through 
listings and IPOs of larger firms, mainly oriented to infrastructures and banking. Panel C provides statistics of the period of de-
globalization (1914-1940) when ASE developed with an internal market orientation  
Simple Listings                                                                      IPOs 
                                                               Panel A: The Whole Period, 1880-1940 
Variable     
 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO 
(%) 
Mean 6.72 82,916 6 166,061 38 
Median 3.5 34,578 3 16,634 33 
No of Obs. 144 144 21 21 21 
Panel B: Sub-Period, 1880-1913 
Variable     
 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO 
(%) 
Mean 6.67 124,470 4 319,275     48 
Median 3 68,793 4 201,401     35 
No of Obs. 34 34 8 8 8 
Panel C: Sub-Period, 1914-1940 
Variable     
 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO 
(%) 
Mean 6.79 70,188 7 114,738 32 
Median 2.5 26,666 3 27,723 29 
No of Obs. 110 110 13 13 13 
Source: Data provided in Appendices C and E 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for Quasi IPOs and IPOs 
This table presents descriptive statistics for Quasi IPOs vis a vis IPOs. Quasi IPOs or ‘Delayed’ IPOs are those cases of listings 
where firms perform a capital increase, offering sale of new shares for cash, within two years from the listing date. AGE, is the age 
of the company in years on the listing date. Size counts the number of new issued shares offered to the public during the IPO or the 
Right Offering procedure multiplied with their offer price in gold sovereigns  
Panel A: Comparison Quasi IPOs with IPOs (The Whole Period) 
                       Quasi IPOs                  IPOs 
Variable 
Quasi IPOs 
Age 
(years) 
    Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO 
Mean 6.90 37,655 38.34 6 166,061 38 
Median 3 18,103 34.74 3 16,634 33 
Min 0 542 0.63 1 1,697 6 
Max 64 208,501 87.42 46 1,564,661 100 
       
No of Obs. 42 42 42 21 21 21 
Panel B: Sub-Period, 1880-1913 
                        Quasi IPOs                       IPOs 
Variable 
Quasi IPOs 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO Age 
(years)  
            Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
 GO 
Mean 12.71 81,263 48.26 4 319,275 48 
Median 3 72,927 49.12 4 201,401 35 
Min 2 44,515 18.36 1 60,445 14 
Max 64 131,181 75.13 11 827,109 100 
       
No of Obs. 6 6 6 8 8 8 
Panel C: Sub-Period, 1914-1940 
                       Quasi IPOs                       IPOs 
Variable 
Quasi IPOs 
Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
GO Age 
(years) 
Size 
(Gold Sov.) 
        GO 
Mean 5.74 30,387 33.18 7 114,738          32 
Median 3 16,111 31.71 3 27,723          29 
Min 0 542 0.64 1 6,740           6 
Max 48 208,501 87.42 46 1,066,666          63 
       
No of Obs. 37 37 37 13 13          13 
Source: Data provided in Appendices D and E 
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Table 5: IPOs, First Trading Day IPO Returns, Size and Money Left on the Table, 1880 - 1940 
IPOs are included in the table. The offer price of IPOs is the price offered during the public offering procedure. First trading price 
is the first closing price of IPOs or listing in the A.S.E. on the observed first trading day. Raw returns for IPOs are the difference 
between the offer (or listing) price and the closing price on the first day of trading and are equally weighted (EW). Market 
adjusted returns are raw returns adjusted by the returns of matching portfolios. Raised Funds and money left on the table are in 
Gold Sovereign prices. The amount of money left on the table by IPOs is defined as the difference (when positive) between the 
closing price on the first day and the listing price, multiplied by the number of shares sold to the public (new investors). In other 
words, this is the profit received by investors who were allocated IPO shares at the offer price, at first trading. It represents a 
wealth transfer from the shareholders of the issuing firm to these investors  
First Day IPO Returns, Raising Funds and Money Left on the Table for IPOs, 1880 to 1940 
Period68 Number of 
IPOs69,70 
Mean Rate (%) of 
First Trading Day 
Returns (RIR) 
Mean Market (%)  
Adjusted Returns*  
(MAIR) 
Size 
(Raised Funds - 
in Gold Sov.) 
Money left on the 
Table 
(in Gold Sov.) 
1884 1 -20 -8.22 21,255 0 
1887 3 -38.12 -39.16 2,383,941 0 
1898 1 -34.4 -39.16 40,000 0 
1900 1  -13.79 -17.88 89,600 0 
1906 1  1.307 -0.072 223,357 0 
1909 1 0.1 2.89 29,795 0 
1917 1 30 26.64 8,943 2,682 
1918 1 7.69 -0.107 50,363 3,872 
1925 7 331.42 301.89 77,636 282,299 
1926 2 45.45 42.22 5,530 2,680 
1927 1 160 156.29 7,997 12,795 
1930 1 52 75.57 537,115 279,300 
      
Sub-Period: 1880-1913 8 -20.15 -22.49 2,787,948 0 
Sub-Period: 1914-1940 13 204.66 188.54 687,584 583,628 
The Whole  Period 21 119.01 108.34 3,475,532 583,628 
* The mean first trading day IPO returns adjusted with the returns of all other listed companies in ASE 
 
                                                          
68  No IPO took place in years not included in the table  
69 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table became according to the first date of entrance of a firm in the 
A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
70 The IPOs concern listings of only common stocks in the Greek stock market 
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Table 6: New Listings in ASE and Economic Growth 
 This table reports the results of multiple regressions using Economic Variables over the period 1884-1940 by employing the 
bootstrapping method. This constructs a number of resamples with replacement of the observed dataset. GDPpc is the Gross Domestic 
Product per capita. DEV stand for the devaluation rate. G1 is the growth rate of GDP.  G2 is the rate of growth of the secondary sector 
(manufacturing). G3 is the rate of growth of the tertiary sector (services). ***Significance at the one per cent level. **Significance at the 
five per cent level *Significance at the ten per cent level 
 
 NLTL NLTL NLTL NLTL NLTL NLTL 
Panel A: The Whole Period 
Constant 0.0818*** 0.0830*** 0.0839*** 0.0862*** 0.0843*** 0.0882*** 
 (0.00004) (0.000081) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
GDPpc 0.000247 0.00002 0.00013    
 (0.712) (0.970) (0.875)    
DEV    -0.0002* -0.000062 -0.0002 
    (0.0709) (0.734) (0.155) 
G1 0.0001   0.0002   
 (0.661)   (0.348)   
G2  0.0005**   0.0005**  
  (0.011)   (0.0354)  
G3   0.0001   0.0001 
   (0.392)   (0.211) 
       
Obs 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Adj R-Squared 0.046 0.061 0.043 0.052 0.053 0.02 
 
Panel B: Sub-Period, 1880-1913 
Constant 0.0581 0.0576* 0.0587* 0.0981*** 0.0884*** 0.0986*** 
 (0.163) (0.0868) (0.0845) (0.00005) (0.00001) (0.000013) 
GDPpc    -0.000350 0.000858 0.000202 
    (0.797) (0.637) (0.914) 
DEV 0.00544 0.00444 0.00528    
 (0.327) (0.325) (0.192)    
G1 -0.00005   0.0007   
 (0.961)   (0.418)   
G2  0.00101   0.001  
  (0.508)   (0.362)  
G3   0.000098   0.0002 
   (0.923)   (0.866) 
       
Obs 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Adj R-Squared 0.079 0.041 0.079 0.126 0.078 0.141 
 
Panel C: Sub-Period, 1914-1940 
Constant 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.0696*** 0.0736*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00002) 
GDPpc 0.0009 0.0008 0.001    
 (0.119) (0.203) (0.248)    
DEV    -0.000162 0.000041 -0.0001 
    (0.242) (0.828) (0.482) 
G1 0.000432   0.0005*   
 (0.142)   (0.072)   
G2  0.000431*   0.0005**  
  (0.079)   (0.048)  
G3   0.000064   0.0001* 
   (0.664)   (0.097) 
       
Obs 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Adj R-Squared 0.060 0.024 0.032 0.050 0.042 0.052 
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Table 7: Results of univariate regressions for IPOs of period 1880-1940 
                             This table reports the results of univariate regressions using the dataset of IPOs launched on Athens 
Stock Exchange in the period 1880-1940. The dependent variable is MAIR=(EPi,t- OPi,0)/OPi,0 - MPRi, 
the IPO returns adjusted with the corresponding returns of all other listed companies in ASE that traded 
in the relevant days. The independent variables are AGE respectively, the log of one plus the age of the 
company in years on the listing date. Size is the number of new issued shares offered to the public 
during the IPO, multiplied with their offer price (measured by the natural logarithm). GO identifies the 
percent of ownership offered by listing firms to new shareholders in the IPO. The estimation results 
have employed the bootstrapping method ***Significance at the one per cent level.  **Significance at 
the five per cent level *Significance at the ten per cent level 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables MAIR MAIR MAIR 
Constant 0.854*** 551.30* 44.48 
 (0.000) (0.054) (0.598) 
AGE 7.606   
 (0.31)   
SIZE  -45.88*  
  (0.082)  
GO   -0.29 
   (0.775) 
    
Obs 21 21 21 
AdjR-squared 0.129 0.249 0.008 
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Source: see Appendix A 
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                                                       Figure 2: Number of listings and IPOs per million inhabitants (1900-1925) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
          Source: Data provided in Appendix A and B  
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Figure 4: Listings 1880-1940. Sectoral analysis during two sub-periods 
 
 
Source: Data are calculated from hand collected evidence. For data source see Appendix A  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  Data Sources 
The main problem we have met in conducting this research is the absence of official uniform data that cover the 60-
year period of the study. It has been necessary to reconstruct data series from a variety of sources. Our sources 
belong in three distinct categories:  Bulletins and Annual Reports of the Athens Stock Exchange and the National 
Statistical Service of Greece; the ‘industrial credit’ files of the National Bank of Greece; daily and weekly press.  
More specifically in the first category we have: 
1. The Athens Stock Exchange’s “Daily Official List” is published for the period 1920-1940. Until 1932 it 
includes daily closing prices of bonds and stocks. In the period 1933-1940, it also includes nominal values, 
number of shares and bonds listed, dividends, highest and lowest daily prices (where they exist). This 
source offers no data on daily volumes, unfortunately. 
2. A parallel source is from the General Statistical Service of Greece which published a “Bulletin of Stock 
Prices” over the period 1918-1940. This includes similar data as above described in the “Daily Official 
List” but also from 1930 onwards it additionally includes monthly and yearly trading volumes.  
3. Annual Yearbooks published by the Exchange for the years 1911, 1914-17, 1926, 1929-31. These include 
additional information for listed companies as of the respective year of publication: year of company 
foundation and year of listing, changes of company name and mergers, dividends, and capital increases. 
  
In the second category, company files kept in the archive of “industrial credit” of the National Bank of Greece 
include: Board of Directors Reports, Stockholders Assembly decisions on capital increases, public offerings, 
dividends and financial statements.  
In the third category is the economic daily and weekly press that offers data for the whole period, as follows: daily 
prices, dividends, public offers and capital increases, company listings and financial statements. A host of 
qualitative information can be gleamed from articles commenting on the state of the market, the operation of the 
“free market” in the early period, government policy and legal initiatives, occasional scandals and stock market 
anomalies. The list of daily and weekly newspapers that we have consulted consists of the following publications: 
 
 
 
Newspaper Period  
CENTURY, (ΑΙΩΝ) 1880-1884 
REGENERATION, (ΠΑΛΙΓΓΕΝΕΣΙΑ) 1880-1882 
HERMES, (ΕΡΜΗΣ) 1882-1909 
ECONOMIST OF ATHENS, (ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΟΛΟΓΟΣ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ) 1883-1885, 1892-1896, 1918-1934 
FORTUNE, (ΤΥΧΗ) 1893-1899, 1900-1906 
ECONOMIC CHRONICLE, (ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΑ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΑ) 1904-1916 
ECONOMIC GREECE, (ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΗ ΕΛΛΑΣ) 1902-1917 
STOCKHOLDER, (ΜΕΤΟΧΟΣ) 1912-1917 
ECONOMIC HERALD, (ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟΣ ΤΑΧΥΔΡΟΜΟΣ) 1926-1940 
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Appendix B: Evolution of number of listed companies per million people in London, Berlin and Athens Stock Exchanges 
We follow Rajan and Zingales (2003) to calculate the number of listed firms per million inhabitants and the number of IPOs per million inhabitants. The number of 
listed companies per million people is the number of domestic companies whose equity is publicly traded in a domestic stock exchange divided by the population in 
millions. The sources for data on London Stock Exchange are from: The Times Book of Prospectuses, The Investor’s Monthly Manual, The Stock Exchange 
Official Intelligence, Chambers and Dimson (2009), Chambers (2010), (2011), Moore (2010) and Burhop et al (2014). The data for Germany are from Schlag and 
Woodrich (2005), Burhop (2010), Moore (2010), Burhop et al (2012). Global Equity data are from Moore (2010)  
 UK   Germany                                Greece 
Period Number of 
IPOs/Listed 
No of IPO/Listed firms 
per million Inhabitants 
Number of 
IPOs/Listed 
No of IPO/Listed firms 
per million Inhabitants 
Number of 
IPOs/Listed per 
million Inhabitants 
No of IPO/Listed 
firms per million 
Inhabitants 
1900 72 1292 2.03 36.49 52   510 0.92 9.04 1 19 0 7.59 
1901 57 1357 1.51 36.16 12   523 0.21 9.19 0 19 0 7.53 
1902 27 1402 0.71 37.35 18  703 0.31 12.16 0 19 0 7.48 
1903 27 1379 0.71 36.32 28  755 0.47 12.87 0 22 0 8.60 
1904 14 1349 0.36 35.13 42  788 0.70 13.25 0 22 0 8.54 
1905 42 1421 1.08 36.59 42  828 0.69 13.65 0 24 0 9.25 
1906 65 1462 1.65 37.22 54  855 0.88 13.98 1 25 0.382 9.57 
1907 51 1507 1.28 37.93 13  881 0.20 14.20 0 26 0 9.88 
1908 32 1234 0.79 30.71 20  884 0.31 14.06 0 28 0 10.57 
1909 99 1203 2.43 29.60 34  890 0.53 13.96 1 32 0.375 12.00 
1910 179 1198 4.41 29.55 36  910 0.55 14.01 0 33 0 12.29 
1911 63 1216 1.53 29.56 22  925 0.33 14.15 0 36 0 13.32 
1912 67 1232 1.62 29.95 33    941 0.49 14.22 0 40 0 14.71 
1913 30 1244 0.72 30.09 19  947 0.28 14.13 0 42 0 8.71 
1914 - 1245 0.43 29.85 10  945 0.14 14.06 0 43 0 8.92 
1915 - 1301 0.75 32.42      *               * * * 0 43 0 8.93 
1916 - 1837 1.02 46.75      *               * * * 0 46 0 9.55 
1917 4 2017 0.63 52.36      *               * * * 1 51 0.207 10.59 
1918 - 2235 0.16 58.37 -  886 - 13.72 1 55 0.207 11.42 
1919 89 2334 1.00 56.07 -  873 - 14.47 0 58 0 12.05 
1920 137 2448 1.48 57.75 -  864 - 13.90 0 62 0 12.36 
1921 20 2492 0.06 57.00 -  871 - 14.36 0 64 0 12.57 
1922 33 2508 0.11 56.57 -  878 - 14.34 0 68 0 11.44 
1923 51 2456 0.29 55.11 -  930 - 15.10 0 72 0 11.85 
1924 38 2475 0.17 55.14  - 1046 - 16.88 0 80 0 13.51 
1925 84 2381 0.88 52.86  - 1050 - 16.57 7 97 1.16 16.19 
* Due to the First World War Berlin Stock Exchange was close 
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Appendix C: No of Listings, No of IPOs & Mean Prices (Trading, Listing, Offer) 
 
Period71 Number 
of 
IPOs + 
Listings 
Number of 
Listings  
Mean  Listing 
Price 
Number of 
IPOs72,73 
Mean   
Offer 
Price 
Mean First Trading 
Price 
1884 3 2 3.91 1 3.82 3.06 
1887 4 1 3.00 3 8.66 4.76 
1889 1 1 6.52 0 - - 
1891 1 1 6.23 0 - - 
1892 2 2 5.74 0 - - 
1893 1 1 14.64 0 - - 
1894 1 1 2.26 0 - - 
1897 1 1 5.89 0 - - 
1898 1 0 - 1 3.48 2.28 
1899 3 3 6.01 0 - - 
1900 1 0 - 1 4.88 4.90 
1903 3 3 5.67 0 - - 
1905 2 2 6.90 0 - - 
1906 1 0 - 1 5.58 5.65 
1907 1 1 3.69 0 - - 
1908 2 2 3.68 0 - - 
1909 4 3 1.95 1 3.82 3.82 
1910 1 1 16.12 0 - - 
1911 3 3 4.03 0 - - 
1912 4 4 3.97 0 - - 
1913 2 2 3.97 0 - - 
1914 1 1 3.97 0 - - 
1916 3 3 4.04 0 - - 
1917 5 4 4.06 1 4.07 5.29 
1918 4 3 4.00 1 5.27 5.68 
1919 3 3 4.06 0 - - 
1920 4 4 4.38 0 - - 
1921 2 2 2.94 0 - - 
1922 4 4 0.52 0 - - 
1923 4 4 0.31 0 - - 
1924 8 8 0.44 0 - - 
1925 17 10 0.54 7 0.30 1.31 
1926 10 8 0.68 2 0.51 0.67 
                                                          
71 No listing or IPO launched on the ASE in years not included in the table 
72 The annual distribution of the new issues of common stocks in this table has been counted according to the first date of entrance of a firm 
in the A.S.E. and not according to the time period of public offerings  
73 The IPOs include listings of only common stocks in the ASE 
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1927 8 7 0.40 1 0.26 0.69 
1928 5 5 0.53 0 - - 
1929 9 9 1.28 0 - - 
1930 2 1 0.26 1 13.33 20.26 
1931 2 2 0.8 0 - - 
1934 2 2 0.11 0 - - 
1935 6 6 0.40 0 - - 
1936 2 2 0.34 0 - - 
1937 5 5 0.39 0 - - 
1938 6 6 0.44 0 - - 
1939 8 8 0.70 0 - - 
1940 3 3 0.88 0 - - 
Total 165 144  21   
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Appendix D: List of Quasi IPOs 
This table presents statistics for Quasi IPOs on year of listing and years of right offer, offer price, trading price, number of shares 
and raising funds (in gold sovereign). The dataset comprises 42 companies listed in Athens Stock Exchange between 1887 and 
1938. During 1880-1913 quasi-IPOs were fewer than IPOs and smaller in terms of capital raised. On the contrary, in the period 
1914-1940, quasi-IPOs were far more numerous than IPOs, and, although they represented smaller offerings on average they led 
to about the same total capital absorption as IPOs 
Panel A: Quasi IPOs  
Quasi IPO Year Year of 
Right Offer 
Offer 
Price 
Trading 
Price 
Number of 
Shares 
Raising Funds 
(in Gold Sov.) 
Public and Municipal Works 1887 1889 3.28 4.78 15,000 49,155 
Hellenic Metal. Company 1905 1906 3.62 2.95 15,000 54,328 
Wines and Spirits Co. 1909 1911 4.52 5.41 29,000 131,181 
Chemicals products and Fertil. Co. 1911 1912 4.58 5.47 20,000 91,526 
National  Steam Navigation Co. 1911 1911 4.17 5.36 28,000 116,870 
Titan Cement Co. 1912 1914 4.45 4.90 10,000 44,515 
Aliveri Mines Co. 1917 1918 4.63 5.52 45,000 208,501 
Agyra General Trading House 1917 1917 4.07 3.51 5,000 20,325 
Piraeus Bank 1918 1918 4.03 9.40 20,000 80,580 
Hellenic Mining Company 1918 1918 4.03 4.59 11,700 47,139 
Piraeus Enterprises Co. 1918 1918 5.04 6.42 2,500 12,590 
BIO General Industrial Co. 1920 1920 2.94 4.02 15,000 44,027 
General Bank of Greece 1921 1923 0.84 9.28 8,000 6,746 
Hellenic Tobacco Company 1921 1922 0.90 1.12 20,000 18,013 
Central Bank of Greece 1922 1923 0.67 1.38 35,000 23,613 
Oropos Mining 1922 1924 0.61 1.20 30,000 18,192 
Greek Woolens Manuf. Co. 1922 1923 0.76 1.08 20,000 15,180 
Kosmadopoulos Bank 1923 1924 1.01 1.92 10,000 10,107 
Tekton Construction Co. 1923 1924 0.61 1.06 50,000 30,321 
Avezap Sugar Prod. Co. 1923 1925 0.44 0.99 30,000 13,274 
Agricultural Industry Co. 1924 1925 0.32 0.93 30,000 9,596 
Bank of Thessaly 1924 1925 0.64 0.88 150,000 95,963 
Bank of Hellenic Securities 1924 1925 0.66 0.90 105,000 69,573 
Maritime Bank 1924 1924 0.65 0.69 19,000 12,290 
Vermion Manuf. Co. 1924 1925 0.78 1.37 35,000 27,189 
Hellenic Silk Co. 1924 1925 0.71 1.66 70,000 49,500 
Naoussa Wool Ind.  1924 1925 0.32 1.30 50,000 15,993 
Atlas Cements Co. 1925 1925 0.91 2.41 85,000 77,570 
Helios Sugar Company 1925 1926 0.28 0.28 14,032 3,993 
Ergon Technical Construction 1925 1925 0.64 1.41 50,000 31,987 
Pharmaceutical Union Co. 1925 1925 0.46 0.80 20,000 9,276 
Cold Storage Piraeus 1925 1925 0.48 0.51 14,000 6,717 
Anatoli Ind. Co. 1926 1927 0.27 0.53 2,000 542 
Olympos Cement Co. 1927 1929 1.00 0.58 50,000 50,000 
Akte Technical Company 1927 1928 0.54 0.62 30,215 16,228 
Ertha Maritime and Hydr. Works 1928 1929 1.00 1.20 15,500 15,500 
Bank of Laconia 1929 1929 0.29 0.34 50,000 14,666 
Trikala Weaving Co.  1935 1936 0.16 0.17 20,000 3,158 
FIX Breweries 1935 1936 0.28 0.63 58,185 16,410 
ETHEL Rubber Co. 1937 1938 0.54 0.98 27,000 14,667 
Iris Chocolate Manuf. 1938 1939 0.10 0.12 10,000 998 
Evangelistria Flour Mills 1938 1939 0.25 0.32 14,000 3,493 
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Appendix E: List of IPOs 
This table presents statistics for 21 Initial Public Offerings listed in Athens Stock Exchange between 1884 and 1940. It includes 
statistics on offer price, trading price, mean rate of initial returns (%), adjusted initial returns, raising funds (in gold sovereign) and 
money left on the table 
 
IPO Year Offer 
Price 
Trading 
Price 
Mean Rate 
of Initial 
Returns (%) 
Adjusted 
Initial 
Returns 
Raising Funds 
(in Gold Sov.) 
Money left on 
the Table 
(in Gold Sov.) 
Powder Co. 1884 3.78 3.02 -20 -8.22 21,255 0 
Hpiro-Thessaly Bank 1887 10.37 9.00 -13.33 -43.61 72,955 0 
Thessaly Railways 1887 9.00 5.01 -44.23 -32.01 920,000 0 
S. P.A.P. Railways 1887 8.64 5.46 -36.8 -41.87 1,390,986 0 
Régie des Revenus Affectés 1898 3.48 2.28 -34.4 -39.16 40,000 0 
Bank of Crete 1900 4.88 4.21 -13.79 -17.88 89,600 0 
Bank of Orient 1906 5.58 5.66 1.30 -0.07 223,357 0 
Commercial Bank 1909 3.82 3.82 0 2.89 29,795 0 
Ermis Industrial Co. 1917 4.07 5.29 30 25.64 8,943 2,682 
Isaias - Megaris Wines and Spirits  1918 5.24 5.64 7.69 -0.10 50,363 3,872 
Enosis Wine and Spirits Co.  1925 0.33 1.31 300 299.03 6,398 19,192 
Kekrops Construction 1925 0.33 2.01 510 499.92 12,235 62,400 
Athena Car Company 1925 0.32 1.75 450 435.34 6,398 28,788 
Sanitas Pharmaceutical Products Ind. 1925 0.30 0.91 200 185.68 3,359 6,717 
Georgiadis-Sekeris Wood Ind.  1925 0.28 0.95 240 236.74 5,758 13,818 
Commercial Credit Bank 1925 0.28 1.25 350 280.63 42,450 148,575 
Kyklops Pottery 1925 0.28 1.03 270 175.93 1,040 2,806 
Hellenic Carpet Factory 1926 0.78 0.94 20.91 16.62 2,426 507.2 
Chemical Industries 1926 0.24 0.41 70 67.82 3,105 2,173 
Diamantopoulos Construction 1927 0.27 0.69 160 156.29 7,997 12,795 
Bank of Greece 1930 13.33 20.27 52 75.57 537,115 279,300 
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Appendix F: Previous Literature on Historical IPOs 
The table provides a summary of the Historic IPO literature concentrating mainly in U.S., Germany and the UK. It indicates the Journal where the articles were 
published, the period that every study explores, the number of IPOs involved, the level of underpricing and a summary of the main findings  
Author(s) –Year Journal Market Period of Study  No of IPOs Underpricing Main Findings 
Fohlin (2000) Working Paper 
Germany - 
U.S. 
1882-1892, 
1998-2000 
335 
Germany : 10%-
22% 
U.S.:  11%-17% 
German results show that significant information 
asymmetries exist despite universality and formal 
relationships. The price of shares contains important 
positive information about the quality or expected returns 
of new issues. 
Jovanovic and 
Rousseau (2001) 
American 
Economic Review 
U.S. 
1890-2000 
1890-1899 
1900-1909 
1910-1919 
1920-1929 
21,516 
112 
112 
214 
545 
 
Companies that first listed at the close of the 19th century 
were as young as the companies today. The electricity-era 
and the information technology-era firms came in younger. 
Wright (2002) 
Accounting, 
Business and 
Financial History 
U.S. - - - 
The early history of the market (1781–1861) shows that 
unregulated IPO markets can function efficiently. Early 
US corporations successfully sold equities directly to 
investors without the aid of intermediaries because they 
could overcome information asymmetry cheaply. Today, 
the Information Revolution is again decreasing the cost of 
reducing information asymmetry between investors and 
issuers. 
Schlag and 
Wodrich (2005) 
Working Paper Germany 1882-1914 297 4.81% 
Underpricing of IPOs has existed but it is considerably 
lower than that observed on today's markets. Employing a 
mixture of distributions approach we also find evidence of 
price stabilization of IPOs. 
Burhop (2008) Working Paper Germany 
 
1870-1896 
180 
Pre 1884: 87 
Post 1884: 93 
1.92% 
0.63% 
3.25% 
In contrast to modern data, first day returns were 
extraordinary low and averaged less than five percent, 
even during the speculative period of the early 1870s. The 
past market return had a negative influence on initial 
returns. 
Chambers and 
Dimson (2009) 
Journal of Finance UK 
1917-1986 
 
1917-1945 
1946-1986 
 
2553 
 
610 
1943 
7.26% 
 
3.80% 
9.15% 
 
During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were 
underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 
9.15% in the period from 1946 to 1986, and even more 
after the U.K. stock market was deregulated in 1986. The 
post-WWII rise in underpricing cannot be attributed to 
changes in firm composition, and occurred in spite of 
improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of 
IPO underwriters. 
Chambers (2009) 
 
Economic History 
Review 
 
U.K. 
 
1946-1986 
1960-1969 
1970-1979 
1980-1986 
Tender - Fixed 
Offer 
118 - 714 
68 -  336 
1 - 219 
49 - 159 
Tender-Fixed 
Offer 
6.39% - 9.76% 
5.62% - 6.49% 
2.14% - 7.72% 
7.55% - 8.95% 
By the 1960s, underpricing of IPOs in the UK was 
regarded as excessive. The tender method (i.e. adopted 
only by ten firms) delivered substantially lower 
underpricing than the fixed-price offer public. This missed 
opportunity cost issuing firms between £1.7 billion and 
£3.5 billion in real proceeds between 1960-1986.  
Lehman (2010) 
 
Working Paper 
Germany 
 
1897-1914 
 
370 
 
2.18% 
IPOs of banks with a higher reputation did not perform 
better than those issued by smaller banks. Universal banks, 
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who were so important for the industrialisation were not as 
important on the German stock market before WW I. 
Chambers (2010) 
 
Financial History 
Review 
U.K. 
 
1919-1938 
 
1406 
 
- 
Consistent with the pecking order theory, Interwar IPO 
proceeds contributed only modestly to domestic industry's 
capital expenditure needs. In terms of the quality of firms 
allowed onto the market, IPO survival rates of the early 
and late 1920s were low. IPOs of capital-hungry new 
manufacturing industries raised no more finance than did 
the rest of manufacturing. 
Fohlin (2010) 
Journal of 
Economic History 
Germany 
 
1882-1892 
 
250 
 
7.23% 
Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s 
experienced low spreads between the price they paid for 
stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the 
market. 
Fohlin and 
Reinold (2010) 
Journal of Historical 
Economics and 
Econometric 
History 
Germany 
 
1904-1910 
  
The results indicate that the Berlin market did not suffer 
from unusually large pricing anomalies; thus, its 
performance was not substantially different from modern 
markets. Also supporting the conclusion of market 
efficiency, a momentum portfolio earns returns not 
different from zero, on average. 
 
Chambers (2010) 
 
Working Paper 
 
UK 
1900-2009 
1900-1909 
1910-1919 
1920-1929 
1930-1939 
6621 
496 
451 
704 
446 
Junior - StartUps 
63% - 29% 
80% - 38% 
100% -12% 
100%-5% 
Although, the LSE had probably become the first choice 
for many firms seeking a listing in the UK by the interwar 
period, there were 21 other stock exchanges throughout 
Britain, all established before WWI. 
Burhop (2011) 
German  Economic 
Review 
Germany 1882-1992 
180 
87 
(pre 1884) 
94 
(post 1994) 
2.49% 
 
0.49 
 
4.37% 
The first-day returns were extraordinary low and averaged 
less than 5%, even during the speculative period of the 
early 1870s. In contrast to modern markets, underpricing 
was higher during hot issue markets. The study indicates 
that cash-flow relevant information contained in the 
corporate charter was readily factored in the first market 
price. Thus, the historical capital market differed from 
today’s market, but seems to have been efficient. 
Burhop, 
Chambers, 
Cheffins (2014) 
Explorations in 
Economic History 
UK 1900-1913 825  
Report that the failure rate of IPOs by way of Special 
Settlement SS was considerably higher even after 
controlling for firms characteristics and for the presence of 
underwriters and elite directors. Overall market-adjusted 
returns for SS IPOs, including the relatively few IPO 
“winners”, were extremely poor. 
Lehmann (2014) 
Economic History 
Review 
Germany 1896-1913 705 3% 
Although the German IPO business was in the hands of a 
small oligopoly, investors did not benefit from the lack of 
competition. One explanation is that the quality of IPOs on 
the German stock market of the time was very good in 
general as a result of the competition between 
underwriters. 
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Appendix G: Parity of gold sovereign-drachma in 1880-1940 period 
This table presents the exchange rate between British Gold Sovereign and Greek Drachmas 
 over the period of the study (1880-1940) 
Year Gold Sovereign Year Gold Sovereign Year Gold Sovereign 
1880 28,60 1903 39,49 1926 386,51 
1881 29,46 1904 34,43 1927 368,55 
1882 29,64 1905 30,80 1928 372,36 
1883 28,29 1906 27,61 1929 375,00 
1884 26,02 1907 27,13 1930 375,00 
1885 25,96 1908 26,85 1931 375,00 
1886 30,34 1909 25,84 1932 753,00 
1887 31,63 1910 25,94 1933 865,40 
1888 32,11 1911 25,16 1934 867,90 
1889 30,51 1912 25,13 1935 873,50 
1890 30,95 1913 25,27 1936 886,40 
1891 32,42 1914 25,16 1937 909,70 
1892 36,60 1915 25,03 1938 920,40 
1893 39,77 1916 24,63 1939 1.002,00 
1894 43,14 1917 24,60 1940 1.076,20 
1895 44,20 1918 24,82   
1896 43,39 1919 24,32   
1897 41,08 1920 34,07   
1898 36,92 1921 70,38   
1899 39,02 1922 166,54   
1900 40,89 1923 296,44   
1901 41,36 1924 247,35   
1902 40,68 1925 312,62   
                          Sources:    - Riginos, M., The movement of exchange rates and money in the Greek market (1856-1912), Athens, 1997                                                                           
- Athens Stock Exchange Yearbook, 1974, p.286 
 
